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ESTABLISHING NEW LEGAL DOCTRINE IN
MANAGED CARE: A MODEL OF JUDICIAL
RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIAL CHANGE
Peter D. Jacobson*
Scott D. Pomfret**
Courts are struggling with how to develop legal doctrine in challenges to the new
managed care environment. In this Article, we examine how courts have re-
sponded in the past to new industries or radical transformations of existing
industries. We analyze two historical antecedents, the emergence of railroads in the
nineteenth century and mass production in the twentieth century, to explore how
courts might react to the current transformation of the health care industry.
In doing so, we offer a model of how courts confront issues of developing legal doc-
trine, especially regarding liability, associated with nascent or dramatically
transformed industries. Our model of doctrinal change includes five steps. The
first step is the emergence of a nascent or transformed industry. In the second step,
courts attempt to apply old doctrine to the nascent industry, resulting in a doc-
trinal mismatch with the realities of the new industry. When faced with this
dilemma, the third step is that courts tend-implicitly or explicitly-to establish
new legal doctrine that favors the industry. Then, in the fourth step, a backlash
against the industry sets in while courts reassess rules favoring the industry. The
last step is the emergence of a new doctrinal method of holding the nascent indus-
try more fully accountable for its operations.
After setting forth the model and its limitations, we discuss the implications for
how courts have responded to the advent of managed care. Our historical analysis
suggests that courts are reluctant to interfere with emerging market arrangements,
such as managed care's cost containment practices. Eventually, courts tend to find
new ways to achieve greater accountability, largely arising from tort law concepts.
* Associate Professor, Department of Health Management and Policy, University of
Michigan School of Public Health. J.D. 1970, University of Pittsburgh School of Law; M.P.H.
1988, University of California-Los Angeles. Funding for this research was provided by a Rob-
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INTRODUCTION
The stunning rise of managed care within the past decade has
radically transformed health care delivery in the United States
from a cottage industry largely controlled by physicians through
the 1980s to a large industrial enterprise dominated primarily by
institutional providers. The changes are both conceptual and prac-
tical. Conceptually, the entire structure of the health care
enterprise resembles only vestigially the prior fee-for-service model
that dominated health care after World War II until the late 1980s.
Practically, health care is now delivered to patients by physicians
operating within large institutions, and governed primarily by mar-
ket-based arrangements.
These changes have both policy and legal implications. From a
policy perspective, the country is debating the locus and extent of
regulating the managed care industry relative to a market-based
approach. The question is whether traditional state regulation
should be the model for managed care or whether regulation
should shift to the private sector with quasi-regulatory entities such
as the National Commission on Quality Care (NCQC) playing a
dominant regulatory role. At the federal level, Congress is consid-
ering patients' rights legislation that would, if enacted, amend the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preemption to
allow greater state regulation of managed care organizations
(MCOs) and to give patients the right to sue MCOs in state court.'
The health policy concern is how to constrain the high cost of
health care without unduly limiting individuals' access to needed
services.
From a legal perspective, the courts are confronted with conflict-
ing policy objectives, such as the trade-off between access to health
care and cost containment, that were not present when the current
medical liability rules were developed. These rules were formulated
in an era where one patient sued one physician and then, perhaps,
a hospital.2 Now courts must determine liability in the context of
potential conflicts between the interests of an individual patient
and the interests of the entire managed care patient population
over the allocation of plan resources. These policy objectives pres-
ent fundamentally different legal questions than those addressed
1. See Health Care Issues, 67 U.S.L.W. 2465, 2479 (1999) (describing current legisla-
tive efforts in this regard).
2. See generally Peter D. Jacobson, Medical Malpractice and the Tort System, 262 JAMA
3320 (1989) [hereinafterJacobson, Medical Malpractice].
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during the fee-for-service era. The development of legal doctrine
will, in part, determine the extent to which managed care cost con-
tainment initiatives will be implemented.
In short, the United States is at a point of doctrinal change in
how courts will react to the transformation of health care delivery.
As in most periods of change, doctrine will develop on three inter-
related axes. The first, and perhaps most important, question is
what legal regime will predominate, tort or contract. The second
inquiry is which liability standard will emerge. The third step occurs
when courts must address the rules that are subsidiary to the chosen
liability standard(s). How courts adjust previous doctrine-both
tort and contract-will have important legal and policy ramifica-
tions. Legally, this adjustment will set the tone for how the courts
determine accountability in the managed care era. On the policy
side, the outcome will influence both the ability of MCOs to sustain
their cost containment objectives and the receptivity of the courts
to regulatory oversight.
3
Despite the burgeoning scholarly literature propounding various
normative approaches to developing doctrine in response to the
rise of managed care, we have not found an article taking a histori-
cal look at how doctrine was developed during equally radical
industrial transformations. In this article, we examine how courts
have reacted to new industries or to radical transformations within
existing industries. We explore two historical antecedents to the
transformation in the health care industry, focusing on how courts
adjusted existing doctrine to new factual scenarios raised by new
industries, which seem particularly relevant in assessing how courts
might think about ensuring accountability in managed care. Spe-
cifically, we examine and assess the doctrinal changes that
occurred with the emergence of railroads in the nineteenth cen-
tury and mass production in the twentieth century. We believe that
a fresh look at these areas will provide insight into the doctrine
courts must now fashion for managed care.
While neither event is, of course, analogous in every respect,
the issues courts confronted in these two areas are remarkably
similar to the issues courts must face now. We do not pretend that
this review will provide easy or uncontroversial answers to this is-
sue. In fact, as we discuss below, there is considerable controversy
among scholars about how courts responded to previous industry
3. See generally Peter D. Jacobson, Legal Challenges to Managed Care Cost Containment
Programs: An Initial Assessment, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 1999, at 69 [hereinafter Jacobson,
Legal Challenges]. At least for managed care doctrine, a fourth axis might be the interaction
with the legislature. We will not explore that interaction in this Article.
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transformations. Nevertheless, our goal in this article is to assess
the historical analogies to try to understand how doctrine changes
and to stimulate further scholarly commentary about the most ef-
fective legal doctrine courts can develop to resolve managed care
disputes.
We offer a model of how courts confront issues of developing
legal doctrine, especially regarding liability, associated with nascent
or dramatically transformed industries. The Article's genesis was
earlier work we had done in health law (described below), particu-
larly focusing on the managed care industry in the United States.
In our survey of cases involving managed care entities in the
courts, we have noticed a rather striking shift in judicial attitudes
toward, and treatment of, managed care. Based on our observa-
tions, we constructed a model that captures the various stages of
the courts' shift. We then asked ourselves whether this model was
peculiar to managed care or, instead, more broadly reflected judi-
cial approaches toward new industries across historical periods.
Although our study is itself nascent, we can conclude, with some
reservations, that our model seems adequately to describe a gen-
eral, broadly applicable pattern.
Part I is a brief overview of scholarly thought on managed care
and of our decision to analyze railroads and mass production. In
Part II, we describe the five steps of the model, from birth of the
industry to the doctrinal shift that holds the industry more fully
accountable for injuries resulting from its operation. Parts III and
IV examine the stories of, respectively, the birth of American rail-
roads and the shift to mass production as historical counterparts to
our emphasis on the health care industry. Part V applies the model
to the managed care industry and suggests that managed care is
now entering the fifth stage of our model. In Part VI, we discuss
the limitations of our model, especially some relevant differences
in the three nascent industries discussed. Focusing primarily on
the contemporary managed care industry, Part VII sketches some
avenues of future research, some ways courts might address the
fifth stage, accountability, and the implications for the managed
care field.
4. See infra Part M.A.
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I. OVERVIEW
A. The Scholarly Debate on Managed Care
We will not attempt a comprehensive review of the scholarly de-
bate over how the courts should respond to the changes in health
care delivery, but we think that a brief summary of one aspect of
that debate is important for the context of our historical analysis.
Specifically, we refer to the philosophical and doctrinal dispute
over the proper balance between tort and contract.
By far the dominant theme in the health care scholarly literature
is that courts should use contracts to guide the legal relationships
between stakeholders. These scholars, most prominently Professors
Clark Havighurst, Richard Epstein, Haavi Morreim, and Mark Hall,
argue that a contract-based approach will facilitate the transforma-
tion of health care into a market-driven industry. Professors
Havighurst and Epstein go so far as to advocate that contracts
alone should determine medical liability standards between the
patient and the physician, although Havighurst has recently
backed away from this in arguing in favor of enterprise liability,
5
and Morreim argues in favor of applying tort to sub-standard tech-
nical care. Each of these contract proponents shares the sense that
the tort standard of care for medical liability is inefficient and that
contracts would more efficiently represent consumer choices. In
each author's view, retaining the current standard of care, which
presumes a unitary standard of care that physicians owe their pa-
tients, undermines the market-based approach required to control
health care costs and ensure more efficient health care delivery.
More recently, the literature favoring an expanded tort regime
has revolved around applying enterprise medical liability (EML) to
MCOs. 6 According to its proponents, the case for EML is that it is
an efficient mechanism to shift control to institutions where quality
of care can be closely monitored, yet it retains the role of the tort
system as a means of accountability.7
5. See generally Clark C. Havighurst, Making Health Plans Accountable for the Quality of
Care, 31 GA. L. Rv. 587 (1997) (arguing that managed care organizations should bear ex-
clusive legal responsibility for their physicians' negligence).
6. See generally, Kenneth Abraham & Paul Weiler, Enterprise Liability and the Choice of the
Responsible Enterprise, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 29 (1994) (arguing that delivery-based enterprise
liability would promote a sound tort system); William Sage, Enterprise Liability for Medical
Malpractice and Health Care Quality Improvement, 20 Am. J.L. & MED. 1 (1994) (arguing that
liability for medical malpractice should be refocused on the organizations).
7. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 6, at 32.
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B. Why Look at Railroads and Mass Production?
The common law generally develops incrementally in response
to changing social and economic circumstances.8 Sometimes, how-
ever, economic and social arrangements change so dramatically
that the courts must adapt existing legal doctrine to a model of
industrial change that has overtaken the context in which the
original doctrine was developed. 9 In these instances, such as with
the current transformation of health care delivery, there is an ini-
tial mismatch between existing legal doctrine and the reality of the
newly developed industry. In other situations, new technology ap-
pears to emerge from an unrecognized industrial paradigm,
requiring courts to make analogies to other areas of law to develop
legal rules. An ongoing example of this is the emergence of the
internet and related technologies.
In American legal history, two areas stand out as analogous to
what the courts currently are confronting with managed care: the
emergence of the railroads and the development of mass produc-
tion techniques. Like managed care, both of these industries
transformed from basically local activities to national markets. In
the process, the developments radically altered consumer expecta-
tions of how goods and services would be delivered and dealt with
the social problem of accidents. These are the same kinds of issues
now being raised in the transformation of health care from a cot-
tage industry based on fee-for-service payment to capitated
managed care. Furthermore, our assessment of the process by
which the courts developed doctrine in these areas suggests dis-
tinct parallels with how the courts are responding to the changes in
health care delivery.
8. See generally NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAw (1998) (explaining the his-
torical development of the common law).
9. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpre-
tive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1785 (1997) (describing a model of doctrinal change).
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Therefore, the courts' responses to radical changes in the rail-
road and mass product contexts may illuminate how legal doctrine
is developed and what lessons might be applicable to judges con-
fronting the challenging legal issues in managed care."0 In
particular, the railroad experience offers a lesson in how courts
settled on the appropriate legal regime to maintain legal account-
ability for accidents as the railroads grew. The mass production
experience is insightful because courts had to analyze mass pro-
duction's combined product and service delivery aspects, much as
courts must now analyze the mixed financing and delivery aspects
inherent in managed care."
10. From the start, we issue a word of caution: our analysis of the railroad and mass
market manufacturing industries is drawn from studies by other scholars, most of whom
have relied upon a review of appellate cases. In our study of the managed care industry, we
have relied only upon published opinions, although they have come from both the trial and
appellate levels. Necessarily, then, we are telling a story-really, three separate stories-
which needs to be confirmed (or disproved) by further research, where possible.
11. A word about our research methods: the research project that forms the basis of
this analysis is designed to explore the role of the courts in shaping health policy. Two par-
ticular aspects of the research are applicable to this Article. First, we conducted a
comprehensive search and synthesis of the health services and law review literature dealing
with the relationship between law and health care. Second, we conducted a case content
analysis of trends in health care litigation. Using standard legal research tools such as 'West-
law and Lexis/Nexis, we reviewed and coded a targeted sample of nearly 500 cases from a
total universe of at least 3750 cases that included the terms "health maintenance organiza-
tion," "HMO," "preferred provider," "utilization review," "managed care," and "IPA"
(independent practice association). This search elicited a wide variety of cases, including
antitrust disputes.
The purpose of the case content analysis was to provide insight into how courts have re-
solved the inherent conflicts presented by managed care, such as between cost containment
and access to health care services; what analytical approaches judges use to resolve cases;
whether there are different approaches across case types, such as utilization management,
medical necessity, or antitrust; and the role policy considerations play in case outcomes.
Each case was coded for the following indicators: whether the opinion discussed health care
policy considerations; which policies were at issue; case outcome; procedural considerations,
such as setting the burden of proof or the standard of review; reliance on the facts of the
case; reliance on precedent; and deference to legislation or contractual obligations.
The case content analysis established the information base to categorize and explain
trends and differences in the development of legal doctrine in managed care, as discussed
in detail below. See infra Part V. Our statistical analysis will be reported in a subsequent arti-
cle.
The information on the railroads and mass production, by contrast, is drawn from legal
scholarship published primarily in leading law journals, including this one. Many of the
authors of the articles on which we have drawn have used an empirical analysis somewhat
similar to the one we have undertaken for managed care. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law
and the Economy in Nineteenth Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1719-20
(1981) [hereinafter Schwartz, Reinterpretation]. Where there was disagreement in the litera-
ture on the results of such analyses, we tried to focus on broad areas of agreement rather
than attempt to resolve continuing debates among scholars far more versed in their subject
than we are.
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II. THE MODEL OF DOCTRINAL CHANGE
A. The Five-Step Model of Doctrinal Change
The five steps of our model are:
1. Underlying Revolution and Birth of Nascent
Industry
2. Doctrinal Mismatch
3. Period of Immunization and Strong Growth
4. Backlash Against Industry
5. Doctrinal Change with New Accountability
Nascent industries are rarely, if ever, born out of the ether.
12
Rather, some evolution of a familiar industry is so sudden, perva-
sive, or extensive that it amounts to a revolution. The result of this
revolution is a "new" or "nascent" industry. The emergence of this
nascent industry is the first step in our model.
One hallmark of the nascent industry is its uneasy fit within es-
tablished parameters and doctrines of contemporaneous legal
doctrine. Therefore, the first reaction, and second step of the pat-
tern, is for courts to attempt to apply old doctrine, without
changing it, to the nascent industry. Sometimes aspects of the old
regime provide an acceptable fit that remains good law for years
with few adjustments." More often, however, there is some ten-
sion-a mismatch of established doctrine and new reality. One
contemporary example of this mismatch is the application of First
Amendment protections to the nascent Internet industry.
Courts are rarely blind to the mismatch. We suggest that courts
faced with this dilemma tend-implicitly or explicitly-to perceive
a policy favoring the nascent industry and to establish new legal
doctrine which favors the industry. 4 Several sources may trigger
this perception: the will of the legislature as expressed in statutory
12. Cf ARNOLD PACEY, TECHNOLOGY IN WORLD CIVILIZATION: A THOUSAND YEAR
HISTORY 147 (1990) ("Few radically new inventions are made without some dependence on
ideas already in circulation .... ").
13. Common carrier liability rules for railroads were drawn from earlier English and
American precedents applicable to stage coaches and other forms of transportation. See
RobertJ. Kaczorowski, The Common Law Background of Nineteenth Century Tort Law, 51 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1127, 1150 (1990) (describing the application of common carrier liability rules to
American railroads).
14. Identifying or "finding" a "public policy" is, of course, a familiar way for a court to
legitimize its position in a democratic society. Cf Lessig, supra note 9, at 1809 (noting the
varying ways in which courts may respond to a need for change in doctrine required by the
legal and factual context).
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law and subsequent regulations; general policy considerations born
out of the judge's (and as a somewhat homogenous group, the
judges') understanding of the economic, political, and social con-
text of the underlying industrial changes; and perhaps even the
perceived tenor of popular opinion. Through doctrine, courts fos-
ter a period of at least partial immunity from liability for the new
industry. This is the third step of our model. Immunized from li-
ability, the new and favored industry is given a legally protected
space in which to flourish. Contrary to other scholars, 5 we empha-
size that the friendliness toward nascent industry may be animated
as much by confusion as by design.
We step aside here briefly to discuss what we mean by immunity.
As we use the term, immunity describes legal doctrine that tends to
produce outcomes more protective of the industry than what
might otherwise be expected from either the logic of precedent or
statutory language. Immunity may not be the intent. Instead it may
be the result of a change in one of three dimensions: in the legal
regime (tort or contract), in the liability standard itself (no liabil-
16
ity, negligence, strict liability, and absolute liability), or in the
rules subsidiary to a particular standard. Res ipsa loquitor, for ex-
ample, is a rule subsidiary to the negligence standard of liability
because it makes it unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove one of the
elements of a negligence tort claim.17 Subsidiary rules are those
rules, then, that operationalize a particular liability standard and
which are used by a court in applying a standard to a set of facts.
The fourth step is the backlash against the industry in general
and against the industry's legal immunity in particular. The sources
of the fourth step may be even more various than those from which
the courts originally found a favorable policy. For example, the
backlash may be expressed through public outcry, the media,
scholars, or legislatures. Even before the backlash triggers any
change in doctrine, courts may participate in it by decrying the
state of the law in published opinions while simultaneously apply-
ing the law strictly, despite the perceived unfairness of doing so.
The fifth and final step of our model is the emergence of a new
doctrinal method that holds the nascent industry more fully
accountable for its operations. It has been suggested that this new
accountability emerges at the point where the rhetorical cost of
15. See MARTIN HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
99-101 (1977) (describing his "Subsidy Thesis").
16. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hansen, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for
Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 692-94 (1993) (defining four liability standards).
17. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 28, at
257-62 (5th ed. 1984) (describing procedural effect of doctrine).
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adhering to the old doctrinal regime, in the face of the backlash,
becomes unbearable."' Within this greater accountability, we have
also seen indications that courts may be advancing their own inter-
ests in one particular way. Often the doctrine courts derive when
an industry is mature seems to reserve to the courts a fair amount
of discretion by settling on flexible, rather than rigid, doctrinal
forms.' 9 Because we have not focused on this aspect of change, we
will allude to it only in a perfunctory way, reserving greater elabo-
ration for our future research.
III. THE RAILROAD STORY
A. Introduction
There is no single railroad story. Historical distance and the fact
that railroads tended to be creatures of the state in which they op-
erated frustrate efforts to create an overarching theory. Therefore
there are several stories. Each attempts to account for changes in
the law at the time of the rise of railroads, roughly 1830 to 1870.
Professor Martin Horwitz's "Subsidy Thesis" 20 is a story which is
particularly hospitable to our model. Professor Horwitz argues that
nineteenth century judges, for the first time, used the common law
in purposive, instrumental ways.2 In particular, he argues that
judges deliberately used the common law to benefit the existing
economic and political powers. Judges changed common law doc-
trine in order to benefit an industry with a judicial "subsidy" by
shifting some of the costs of that industry to individuals, particu-
larly poor and powerless individuals. The railroads were chief
among the industries so benefited.24 Horwitz argues that courts
achieved this result by shifting the liability standard from what (he
claims) otherwise would have been applicable, i.e., from strict li-
ability to negligence, which made it more difficult for plaintiffs to
18. See Lessig, supra note 9, at 1795 (describing how doctrines change in light of new
circumstances).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 105-08.
20. See HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 253.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 53.
23. See id. at 99-100; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
473 (2d ed. 1985).
24. See HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 69-71 (describing railroads' complaints about dam-
age and subsequent changes in law).
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recover.25 Courts also changed the subsidiary rules by promulgating
such concepts as contributory negligence and the fellow servant
rule.26
Horwitz's account has been widely criticized." For example, in
examining cases from five states, Professor Schwartz finds no evi-
dence of a subsidy to industrial development in general or• 28
railroads in particular, except perhaps in the fellow servant rule. 9
Instead, Schwartz argues that the negligence (fault-based) liability
standard, far from being created by nineteenth century jurists, had
a long tradition in the law.3 0 Thus, Schwartz sees no shift in the li-
ability standard. Moreover, Schwartz argues that subsidiary rules of
the negligence liability standard were "applied with impressive
sternness to major industries and that tort law exhibited a keen
concern for victim welfare.",3 Schwartz has in turn been criticized
for the time periods he employed, for his generalization from a
limited sample of states, and for his exclusive use of appellate
32
cases.
As no definite consensus has emerged as to which, if either, of
these accounts is correct, we have navigated a middle ground in
fashioning our own account. From reviewing a wide selection of
commentators, we hope to capture the common ground between
Schwartz and Horwitz, while deferring to other commentators-or
taking no position at all-where their disagreement is profound.
For example, given the mixed historical evidence on whether the
fault-based liability standard became newly widespread in the
nineteenth century,33 we focus instead on the subsidiary rules of
that era. As a second example, unlike Horwitz we do not take a
25. See id. at 85.
26. See id. at 209-10.
27. See, e.g., Kaczorowski, supra note 13, at 1199; Schwartz, Reinterpretation, supra note
11, at 1718 passim; Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 641, 641 passim (1989) [hereinafter Schwartz, Tort Law].
28. See Schwartz, Tort Law, supra note 27, at 664-65; Schwartz, Reinterpretation, supra
note 11, at 1773-75.
29. See Schwartz, Reinterpretation, supra note 11, at 1720, 1767-72.
30. See id. at 1722-34 (tracing historical origins of negligence).
31. Id. at 1720 (footnote omitted).
32. See, e.g., James Logan Hunt, Note, Private Law and Public Policy: Negligence Law and
Political Change in Nineteenth Century North Carolina, 66 N.C. L. REV. 421, 423 n.28 (1988)
[hereinafter Hunt, Private Law]; James L. Hunt, Ensuring the Incalculable Benefits of Railroads:
The Origins of Liability for Negligence in Georgia, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 375, 381 (1998)
[hereinafter Hunt, Incalculable Benefits] ("[I]nsistence on broad generalization, limited
chronology, and a dichotomous winners and losers approach for the entire century may
have distorted accounts of early negligence law.").
33. See generally Schwartz, Reinterpretation, supra note 11, at 1773-75 (comparing his
conclusions with those of other commentators).
SUMMER 1999]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform[
strong position on how "deliberate" the changes in doctrine were.
We turn now to the telling of our story.
B. Setting the Stage
Keeping in mind the divergent scholarship, we begin by describ-
ing the state of doctrinal development before the advent of the
railroad. Tort, insofar as we think of it as a regime imposing on
strangers a general and mutual duty of care, was not a coherent
concept prior to railroads and industrializationM Suits for damages
tended to be based on the relationship between the parties,5 often
arising out of status, property, or contract considerations. 36 Thus,
courts would "discover ''37 duties based on relative status: employer-
employee, innkeeper-guest, or passenger-carrier.5 A common car-
rier, for example, was held strictly liable for injuries to his
passenger, based on the relationship between them. 9
Duties could also arise from the terms of a contract,40 though
courts did not evaluate the intrinsic fairness of contracts, as they
would in later years through doctrines like unconscionability and
41the idea of contracts of adhesion. Parties to a contract were pre-
sumed to have equal bargaining power, and the contract was
enforced strictly according to its terms.
Finally, property considerations led courts to imply duties.43 Be-
fore the railroad, the owner of property was generally required to
use his property so as not to hurt his neighbors. Conversely, to
those entering the owner's property, the owner's duty was less rig-
34. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 299; James R. Hackney, Jr., The Intellectual
Origins of American Strict Products Liability: A Case Study in American Pragmatic Instrumentalism,
39 Am.J. LEGAL HIST. 443, 453 (1995); Hunt, Incalculable Benefits, supra note 32, at 397.
35. See Hunt, Private Law, supra note 32, at 424.
36. See Robert Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15
GA. L. REv. 925, 933-45 (1981).
37. See Lessig, supra note 9, at 1792-93 (noting that the common law was viewed as
something "discovered" rather than fashioned).
38. See Rabin, supra note 36, at 933-45.
39. See Kaczorowski, supra note 13, at 1129-30 (noting that, at this time, contract and
tort were not so distinct as concepts to permit a clear statement as to under which of the two
theories plaintiff-passengers might be said to have recovered).
40. See HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 87.
41. See Rabin, supra note 36, at 947 (attributing certain tort doctrines to assumptions
about freedom of contract).
42. Cf id. at 946 ("The mere existence of a claim based on a defective product, rather
than any actual bargaining involving the injured plaintiff, led the common lawjudge to draw
on a contract analogue.").
43. See HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 71, 95, 99 (discussing change from this principle).
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orous and generally governed by status: he owed a higher duty to
invitees than to strangers (trespassers)." Outside of these contract,
property, and status-based duties, "the general principle of our law
was that loss from accident must lie where it falls."45 Into this doc-
trinal structure, the railroad industry was born.
C. Applying the Model
1. Birth of a Nascent Industry---All the railroad stories share the
fact that the railroad was revolutionary.46 It decreased travel time
and cost and was the key to economic development, connecting
farms to cities and seaports.4 7 The railroads' rise to dominance is
reflected in the fact that the miles of track laid rose from 3000 in
1840 to 52,000 in 1870.48 During this time, the railroad was in its
relatively youthful stages and largely confined to areas of economic
importance.4 9 But the first transcontinental railroad was completed
in 1869,50 signaling perhaps the maturation of the industry. Part of
the revolutionary nature of the railroads in this period was the
drastic increase in the number of personal injuries they pro-
duced, I which courts were called upon to address.
2. Doctrinal Mismatch-The background doctrinal structure ac-
commodated neither the nature nor the volume of railroad
accidents. 5 2 "[T]he courts were confronted with recurrent injury
situations having no close analogue in the earlier common law.
Railroads and motor vehicles, for example, created a variety of risks
to strangers that bore no obvious likeness to the harm caused by
stampeding animals, stealthy poachers, or irresponsible innkeep-
ers."53 Such accidents included fires started from sparks thrown off
by locomotives that burned both fields and houses, as well as colli-
sions with wandering cattle and inattentive human beings. Railroad
44. See Rabin, supra note 36, at 935-36.
45. OLIVER WENDALL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 94 (1881).
46. See also Rabin, supra note 36, at 928 ("[F]ault liability emerged out of a world-view
dominated largely by no-liability thinking.").
47. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 468.
48. See id. at 471.
49. See THOMAS V. DIBACCO, MADE IN THE U.S.A.: THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN Busi-
NESS 139 (1987).
50. See PACEY, supra note 12, at 150.
51. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 300, 468.
52. See id. at 300 ("Existing tort law was simply not designed to deal with [railroad] ac-
cidents. ...").
53. Rabin, supra note 36, at 947.
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accidents also included injuries to passengers and, perhaps most
dramatically, terrible injuries to railroad workers. The fires and
collisions were doctrinally troublesome because they involved in-
jury to strangers, who generally shared no contract, property, or
status-based link to the railroad company. These concepts, based
on a world view of ongoing, personal, and consensual relation-
ships, did not give courts the conceptual tools to account for, or
allocate the costs of, injuries. In addition, the personal injuries-to
workers especially-were troublesome because of their volume,
which was like nothing the courts had seen before. As an example
of the carnage, consider that in a one year period from 1888 to
1889, one worker died for every 357 employed, and one out of
thirty-five was injured.54 Courts were troubled by the potential for
ruinous, unchecked liability that could inhibit economic initiative
and which threatened to clog the whole court system. Lawsuits
,,56were seen as a threat to the health of a "precarious enterprise.
The railroads' novelty, therefore, confronted the courts with diffi-
cult doctrinal choices: "[W]hether railroads would be held to a
standard of negligence, strict liability, or something in between was
in doubt.'5 7 Tort emerged as a coherent concept,58 largely as a tool
to enable courts to deal with the railroad issues.
3. Period of Immunity-There is no question, however, that in
facing these questions, courts recognized the importance of rail-
roads.
Railroad associations have become of great and growing
importance; they afford hi-ways of incalculable value to
commerce, and the ever ready means of social inter-
course between distant communities. They are, at this
moment, welding together, link after link, the conserva-
tive chain, which is to hold in firm union, more than six
and twenty States .... 59
54. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 479.
55. See id. at 468.
56. Id.
57. Hunt, Private Law, supra note 32, at 426.
58. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 300 (attributing emergence of tort as a coherent
concept to the rise of railroads); see also Percy H. Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law
of Torts, 42 L.Q. REv. 184, 195 (1926) (describing the emergence of the concept of negli-
gence in torts).
59. State v. Tupper, 23 S.C.L. (Dud.) 135, 141 (1838), quoted in Schwartz, Tort Law, su-
pra note 27, at 652.
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In the context of justifying the emerging negligence regime, Ol-
iver Wendell Holmes noted that "the public generally profits by
individual activity,"6 ° and " [a] s action cannot be avoided, and tends
to the public good, there is obviously no policy in throwing the
hazard of what is at once desirable and inevitable upon the actor."
6
1
Holmes's words suggest a certain concern for the continuing
health of the railroad industry, which was nothing if not active and
vigorous. The perceptions of judges like Holmes were probably
bolstered by the fact that "[t]he plain people loved the railroad
passionately., 62 Even Walt Whitman celebrated it in poetry.63 The
railroad was generally treated as a symbol of positive change.64
Courts acted to some degree on this recognition of a favorable
attitude toward railroads by reducing the extent of their liability.65
In Georgia, for example, the Supreme Court "was very concerned
about 'excessive' liability, which was generally understood in eco-
nomic terms: liability that would put railroads out of business.,
66
Given the mixed historical evidence offered by Professors Horwitz
and Schwartz, we are unable to comment with any certainty about
whether, as a general matter, there was a shift in the liability stan-
dard from strict liability to negligence. However, absolute
liability-which was a standard courts could have found applicable
based on the maxim that one must use one's property so as not to
injure another 61-was rejected because of the specter of draining
the coffers of industrious enterprises. 68 Arguably, then, notwith-
standing any change or lack thereof with regard to the negligence
liability standard in tort that ultimately emerged, the rejection of
absolute liability alone may be seen as a judicially created
immunity. In Georgia, courts justified the rejection of absolute li-
ability expressly to protect railroads:
Besides its oppressive injustice, [absolute liability] would be
grossly inexpedient, inasmuch as it would deny to the public
the incalculable benefits of Railroads, for no company would
60. HOLMES, supra note 45, at 97.
61. Id.
62. DAVID FREEMAN HAWKE, NUTS AND BOLTS OF THE PAST: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
TECHNOLOGY 1776-1860, at 232 (1988).
63. See PACEY, supra note 12, at 165 (describing poetry of Whitman).
64. See id. at 164-65.
65. See HAWE, supra note 62, at 219 (stating that Massachusetts Supreme Court Chief
Justice Lemuel Shaw "led the way in adapting the common law to the needs of the railroad
enterprise") (internal quotations omitted).
66. Hunt, Incalculable Benefits, supra note 32, at 427.
67. See Hunt, Private Law, supra note 32, at 427.
68. See Ryan v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210, 216-17 (1866).
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long exercise franchises thus encumbered .... Railroads, by
virtue of their charters, are exempted from the operation of
the Common Law, as to liabilities for injuries done to prop-
69
erty.
The subsidiary rules offer better mechanisms for analysis in this
regard. One example is the fellow servant rule, which was adopted
in many jurisdictions. Created at the birth of the railroad industry,
the fellow servant rule prevented a railroad employee from recov-
ering from the railroad for personal injury due to the negligence
of one of his co-workers. ° Because any negligent conduct resulting
in injury was likely to be that of a fellow servant, the railroad was
relieved of the burden of one possible heavy cost.7' The rule may
be seen as an immunity because of this benefit and because the
rule was contrary to the general rule of agency, in which a princi-
pal is liable for the acts of his agent.72 Thus, given a choice and
unconstrained by clear precedent, courts that adopted the fellow
servant rule effectively granted an immunity at the time of the rail-
road's incipient development.
73
The following evidence from several states also seems to reflect
courts' favorable treatment of railroads when the existing doctrine
met new factual scenarios caused by the new industry. In Maryland,
courts were resistant to choosing a liability regime that would im-
pose the greatest duties and costs on railroads.74 The courts several
times interpreted liability statutes considerably more leniently than
the legislature intended,75 leading to immediate statutory amend-
ments that expressly required the higher standard that the courts
had rejected.76 In Georgia, courts resisted the higher liability stan-
dards that legislatures preferred.77 Moreover, Georgia courts
endorsed a shift away from absolute common carrier liability. By
enforcing contractual disclaimers of liability to which they had pre-
viously given no effect, the Georgia courts also put the burden of
proving railroad negligence on the plaintiff.78 In North Carolina,
69. Macon & W.R.R. Co. v. Davis, 13 Ga. 68, 85-87 (1853), quoted in Hunt, Incalculable
Benefits, supra note 32, at 395. In the Davis case, the court was interpreting legislation that
chartered railroads to determine the appropriate standard of liability.
70. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 301-02.
71. See id. at 301-02.
72. See id. at 301.
73. See id. at 301-02.
74. See Schwartz, Tort Law, supra note 27, at 656.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Hunt, Incalculable Benefits, supra note 32, at 386.
78. See id. at 401.
[VOL. 32:4
Establishing New Legal Doctrine
the doctrine also tended to produce verdicts for the railroad de-
fendants,79 and the language and reasoning of the railroad cases
were clearly pro-railroad. s°
Nationwide, the doctrine of assumption of risk also immunized
railroads from much liability,8' and some historians attribute the
doctrine's growth to "spoon-feeding [the railroad] enterprise, the
blind desire for economic growth. 82 Assumption of risk provided
that railroad employees, by agreeing to employment in a danger-
ous industry, assumed the risk of their injuries and therefore could
not recover from the railroad.83 The doctrine was also applicable to
those who willingly put themselves in a position of danger."' Its use
increased drastically in cases from the dawn of the railroad era.5
Finally, the once legally moribund idea that a tort action was per-
sonal, and ended when the injured person died, was resurrected
for the purpose of protecting railroads from wrongful death ac-
tions.86 "The thrust of the rules, taken as a whole, approached the
position that corporate enterprise should be flatly immune from
actions for personal injury."
87
Yet the period of immunization did not entail complete immu-
nity. Courts characterized the railroads in a manner similar to
other common carriers. Indeed, the idea of liability for common
carriers with respect to guests (passengers), one of the oldest ideas
in the law,88 easily transferred to railroads.8 9 Despite this, the nine-
teenth century saw the rise of the contributory negligence rule in
most jurisdictions.9 Contributory negligence barred recovery for
passenger and employee alike in the event that the injured person
79. See Hunt, Private Law, supra note 32, at 429.
80. See id. at 429-30 (describing the court's reasoning).
81. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 473.
82. Id. at 472-73.
83. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 17, at 161 (describing doctrine and citing cases).
84. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 472.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 473-74 (citing Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475 (1848)).
87. FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 475.
88. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 17, § 28, at 161.
89. See Nathan Honson, Note, Iowa Tort History, 1839-1869: Subsidization of Enterprise or
Equitable Allocation of Liability?, 81 IOWA L. REV. 811, 818-20 (1996) (describing how courts
applied principles derived in pre-railroad common carrier liability cases in railroad cases).
90. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 471 (citing Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Con-
tributory Negligence, 41 U. ILL. L. REV. 151 (1946) (generalizing from many jurisdictions));
Hunt, Incalculable Benefits, supra note 32, at 413-14 (addressing case of Georgia). But see
Honson, supra note 89, at 819-20 (arguing that in Iowa the contributory negligence rule did
not favor carriers over passengers).
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was at fault to any degree, ' thus insulating the railroad from liabil-
ity in these situations. 2
4. Backlash-In time, however, came the backlash. "Politically,
the rage of the victims counted for very little in 1840, not much in
1860; by 1890, it was a roaring force."93 In North Carolina, for ex-
ample, the general assembly changed the law regarding burden of
proof so that plaintiffs began to win more personal injury cases.94
Railroads began to lose public favor,99 and relatedly, public fund-
ing. Farmers organized in anti-railroad movements like the
Grangers and the Populists.96 Legislatures imposed more liability
on railroads by statute,97 and some judges began to speak of the
"hardship and injustice" for which the fellow servant doctrine was
responsible .9
5. Doctrinal Change Toward Increased Accountability-The fifth
stage of our model followed: while still fearing that too much liabil-
ity might ruin commercial life, the courts adjusted doctrine to
favor railroads less.9 In some jurisdictions, ideas of comparative
negligence replaced contributory negligence.1l° Courts created ex-
ceptions to mitigate the effect of the fellow servant rule and
developed new counter-rules. 1' For example, in cases where the
defendant's fault greatly outweighed that of the plaintiff, some
courts modified the contributory negligence rule to allow a plain-
tiff's recovery° 2--arguably the first step toward a more forgiving
comparative negligence rule. Also, the Supreme Court refused to
allow railroads to contract out of common carrier liability for neg-
ligence committed by their employees.0 3 By the second half of the
91. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 302.
92. See id. at 471 (describing the rise in the use of contributory negligence doctrine
from 1850 to 1880).
93. Id. at 476.
94. See Hunt, Private Law, supra note 32, at 429.
95. See id. at 433.
96. See DIBACCO, supra note 49, at 142.
97. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 478-79 (listing and describing example statutes
from the various states).
98. Id. at 481.
99. See Hunt, Private Law, supra note 32, at 431-32. Professor Friedman points out,
however, that the courts did not go as far as they might, given that the famous case of Ry-
lands v. Fletcher, L.R., 3 H.L. 330 (1868), if adopted in this country, might have called for a
rule of absolute liability for industrial accidents. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 485. Fear of
crippling the new industries helped prevent the adoption of such a rule. See id. at 486.
100. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 476.
101. See id. at 483-84.
102. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 17, § 67, at 469-70 (describing doctrinal experi-
ments in Illinois and Kansas).
103. See Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 384 (1873), construed in Kac-
zorowski, supra note 13, at 1155.
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century, negligence was fixed as the proper rubric under which to
analyze the cases.104
An interesting corollary to the widespread use of the negligence
regime was the emergence of somewhat vague concepts like proxi-
mate cause and due care, °5 as well as the somewhat ad hoc
assignment of burdens of persuasion. 106 Both vague doctrine and ad
hoc practice suggest that courts reserved to themselves a certain
amount of discretion that they did not have with more hard-and-
fast rules like the fellow servant doctrine. Thus, an incidental bene-
fit of the doctrine developed around railroads was the courts'
allocation to themselves of additional discretionary power, in which
pro- or anti-railroad approaches (or pro- or anti-plaintiff ap-
proaches) might exhibit themselves as time went on, and the
industry matured.' Certainty was out, accountability was more or
less in, and a body of doctrine had now formed around the newly
matured industry.
0 8
IV. THE MASS PRODUCTION STORY
A. Introduction
Mass production is a name for "the method of producing goods
in large quantities at low cost per unit .... The mass production
process itself is characterized by mechanization to achieve high
volume, elaborate organization of materials flow through various
stages of manufacturing, careful supervision of quality standards,
and minute division of labour."' 9 The story of mass production
that we tell is also necessarily complex, although for different rea-
sons than the railroad case. First, we did not find much
104. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 17, § 28, at 161.
105. See Thomas C. Galligan Jr., Contortions Along the Boundary Between Contracts and Torts,
69 TUL. L. REV. 457, 468 (1994) (stating that proximate cause, for example, has been used
.not only to protect defendants from unlimited liability but also to shield defendants from
full liability").
106. See Hunt, Private Law, supra note 32, at 435-36 (describing essentially ad hoc ap-
proach to burdens of persuasion that reflected judges' ideological stance as much as
doctrine).
107. See id. at 436-38.
108. As to railroad employees, at the beginning of the twentieth century, state and fed-
eral statutes such as FELA and worker's compensation began to replace the state tort rules.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 484.
109. Melvin Kranzberg, History of the Organization of Work: Organization of Work in the In-
dustrial Age: The Coming of Mass Production, Britannica CD, Version 97, Encyclopedia
Britannica, Inc. (1997) [hereinafter Kranzberg, Britannica CD].
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disagreement on what actually happened; mass manufacturing en-
tailed changes in two types of liability-contract and tort. Second,
in mass manufacturing the immunity arose not simply from doc-
trinal change but also from the failure of doctrinal change in the
face of a changing world." ° Third, pinpointing the relevant begin-
ning and ending dates of the nascent and mature periods of mass
production doctrine is much more difficult. Part of the problem is
our own strategic decision not to focus on a particular industry that
mass produced-a decision forced on us by the paucity of scholar-
ship in any particular industry. We had to find a combination of
practices and advancement sufficient to be labeled "mass produc-
tion."
B. Setting the Stage
With these limitations in mind, we begin our story with an ex-
planation of the background doctrinal context. Although tort was
coming together as a coherent subject in the years immediately
preceding the mass production era," there was no history of tort-
like recoveries for injuries due to bad products. 2 Where available,
recoveries came in contract. 3 Such contract recoveries provided
for strict (i.e., no fault) liability once breach of contract was
shown" 4 As we noted in setting the stage for the railroad cases,
contracts were strictly construed: an express warranty as a term of
the contract was necessary in order to recover for product-based
injury." 5 The baseline rule where the contract was silent was caveat
emptor-let the buyer beware."6 Moreover, the operation of ex-
press warranties was further limited: only those in privity with the
110. Cf Lessig, supra note 9, at 1795 (arguing that the contestability of legal practice
arises from change in practice, change in understanding of practice, or both).
111. See supra Part III.B (describing how the railroads drove the formation of tort as a
coherent concept in the law).
112. See Rabin, supra note 36, at 936-38. Liability for such production (loosely, products
liability) began against a background of non-liability; that is, the early nineteenth century
saw the flowering of the concept of caveat emptor-let the buyer beware. See KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 17, § 95A, at 679.
113. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 17, § 95A, at 679-80 (describing origin of products
liability in contract).
114. SeeJOHN D. CALAMARI &JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 14-2, at 588 (3d ed.
1987) (noting that typically showing a breach of contract alone entitled plaintiff to a rem-
edy, regardless of fault).
115. See Croley & Hansen, supra note 16, at 696.
116. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 17, § 95A, at 679.
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producer could recover from him."7 Thus, for the most part, there
was neither tort nor contract recovery for defective products ex-
cept on express warranty, and even then only for those in privity.
Even before the mass production era, however, there were excep-
tions to the no-tort-like-liability rule for items that were imminendy
or inherently dangerous to human safety.1s This was the doctrinalbackground existing at the birth of the mass production industry.
C. Applying the Model
1. Birth of an Industry-It is difficult to pinpoint when mass
market manufacturing began; certainly by the third quarter of the
nineteenth century, some mass market manufacturing had begun
in isolated industries.1 9 These industries included sewing machines
(1846), Yale locks (1855), and typewriters (1868)." ° None of these
products appear to have presented inherent dangers. Further-
more, efforts to use scientific management to cut costs were still in
a primitive stage prior to the turn of the century.12' In 1899, Ran-
som E. Olds began mass production of cars in Detroit.12 However,
mass production only came to its full fruition when Henry Ford's
assembly line mass-produced the Model T in 1913.123
2. Doctrinal Mismatch-Mismatch occurred because the world
changed, but the doctrine did not.12 4 Contract recovery doctrines,
such as privity, were premised on a world in which transactions
tended not to involve numerous middlemen, but instead involved
personal, face-to-face encounters in the course of a continuing re-
lationship. In this period, a majority of purchases were for items of
necessity, and the consumer was reasonably familiar with what con-
stituted acceptable quality of the items purchased.12 Without a
doubt, there were power inequities in this pre-mass-production
117. SeeWinterbottom v. Wright, 10 M&W 109, 114, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842), cited
in Rabin, supra note 36, at 936-38.
118. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 17, at 682.
119. See Kranzberg, Britannica CD, supra note 109.
120. See PACEY, supra note 12, at 146.
121. See DiBACCO, supra note 49, at 142.
122. See id. at 174.
123. See Kranzberg, Britannica CD, supra note 109.
124. Cf Lessig, supra note 9, at 1793-95 (noting that as the federal general common law
came to include a broader range of law, the "emerging impropriety" created pressure to
restructure federal common law practice).
125. See EARL W. KINTER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 9 (2d ed.
1978) (detailing the early growth of advertising in parallel to mass production growth).
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world, but they did not compare with the vast wealth, power, and
informational inequality existing between today's consumers and
mass product manufacturing corporations. 2 1 Systems of advertising
were personal, and systems of distribution were underdeveloped in
comparison to the mass production era. Both a privity limitation
and a requirement of express warranties made sense in light of the
conditions of production and exchange. Because most exchanges
occurred face-to-face, privity was often present and thus did not
function so often as a limitation. Additionally, in the absence of
power inequalities, requiring express warranties was not unfair.
But courts failed to adapt the old doctrine to the realities fos-
tered by the new industry. Judges were familiar with treating
product defects as contract issues. Thus, judges largely abjured a
tort analysis, apparently feeling these cases arose under contract
doctrine to the exclusion of tort doctrine. 127 Yet the old contract
doctrines that had been developed in a bygone world of face-to-
face encounters did not fit the conditions which existed in the
early mass production era. By the time of the mass production era,
the railroad industry had fully matured, facilitating distribution in
a timely fashion over great distances. 2 8 Advertising in the mass
production era became increasingly national in scope. Mass pro-
duction separated the producer from the end-user, 0 weakening
personal concerns of the seller that might have forced producers
to consider more carefully the safety of their products.'
3. Period of Immunity-The result of the doctrinal mismatch was
that contract liability, which had been relatively effective in obtain-
ing recoveries in the pre-mass production era (and entailed strict
liability regardless of fault in the event of a breach), became much
less powerful with the onset of mass production. Rarely did the
privity required for contract recoveries exist, given the system of
exchange in the mass production era. As a consequence, the priv-
ity doctrine-although itself stable-became a powerful source of
126. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 95 (N.J. 1960) (describing
this change).
127. See Rabin, supra note 36, at 937 (describing this phenomenon and attributing this
reason to it).
128. See Kranzberg, Britannica CD, supra note 109.
129. See Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 77 (describing this change); see also KINTER, supra
note 125, at 3-5.
130. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BusINEss ENTERPRISE 51-53 (1904), cited
in Hackney, supra note 34, at 465.
131. See Hackney, supra note 34, at 465.
132. SeeKEETON ET AL., supra note 17, § 96, at 681-82.
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immunity for the nascent industry.3 ' Moreover, courts at this time
enforced disclaimers of warranty liability, which further prevented
contract recoveries, even for those in privity. This was the general
rule for the early decades of the mass marketing era, 35 so prior to
1960 few recovered on a contract theory. 136 As was the case with the
railroad industry, the immunity was not total, but it was effective.
Few cases were brought,3 7 thereby achieving one of the acknowl-
edged purposes of this immunity-to safeguard manufacturers
against extensive liability to strangers, which was seen as too heavy
a burden for industry to bear.
138
Immediately before the mass production era, as noted above,
there already existed some tort-like liability for products that were
imminently or inherently dangerous to human safety.139 At the
same time, the idea of tort law (in areas other than products liabil-
ity) had begun to coalesce on account of the railroads, resulting in
the dominance of a negligence regime.'0 These two trends came
together in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 141 where Judge Cardozo
imported a general rule of negligence liability from railroad-driven
tort law and applied it to products, regardless of privity or its ab-
sence. 142 This general rule, according to Judge Cardozo, merely
recognized that the exceptions for products that were imminently
or inherently dangerous to human safety were so numerous as to
eclipse the previous rule of no tort-like liability for products.43 Al-
though MacPherson is often cited as a watershed case, 14 it may
readily be seen to have done exactly what it purported to do:145 it
simply united the negligence-dominated field of tort with tort-like
liability for products imminently or inherently dangerous to hu-
man safety.
146
133. See Robert L. Rabin, Tort Law in Transition: Tracing the Patterns of Sociolegal Change,
23 VAL. U. L. REv. 1, 7 (1988) [hereinafter Rabin, Tort Law] (arguing that requiring that the
victim of a product injury be in contractual "privity with the defendant served as an effective
damper on litigation against product manufacturers").
134. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 17, § 95A, at 681; see alsoJohn W. Wade, Strict Product
Liability: A Look at Its Evolution, THE BRIEF, Fall 1989, at 8, 53.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 684.
137. See Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58
N.Y.U. L. REv. 796, 797 (1983) [hereinafter Schwartz, New Products].
138. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 17, § 96, at 682.
139. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 118.
140. See HOLMES, supra note 45, at 76-77; see also supra text accompanying note 60.
141. 111 N.E. 1050, 1052-53 (N.Y. 1916).
142. See id. at 1052-53.
143. See id. at 1052 (noting the "trend ofjudicial thought").
144. See, e.g., Croley & Hansen, supra note 16, at 697.
145. See Schwartz, New Products, supra note 137, at 798.
146. See id. at 798-99.
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Although at first glance Cardozo's opinion appeared hostile to
the nascent mass production industry, 47 and although it found
141 149efecgeneral acceptance, its actual effect was not that great. 49 Actual
recoveries for negligence on a tort theory were small: "[P]roduct
defect claims, even after MacPherson, seem to have made modest
demands on the legal system and to have gone unnoticed in the
political forum."'50 MacPherson did not trigger a substantial increase
in product liability litigation.' 5' The negligence doctrine retained
teeth that made recovery difficult.'*" For example, res ipsa loquitor
was unavailable to plaintiffs because traditionally it required exclu-
sive control by the manufacturer, which was obviously not the case
when the product was put in the consumer's hand via a third
party.5 3 Negligence was therefore difficult to prove. 154 Also, the tort
rule was mutable by contract, at least as it applied to purchasers:
mass producers could disclaim liability, and courts would enforce
the disclaimers. 5 5 Acceptance of Cardozo's opinion actually cut off
a line of authority developing toward strict liability and thus in it-
self represented a kind of immunity.' 56 Notwithstanding this
abbreviated line of authority, recovery on a contract theory-had
there been no subsidiary rules such as privity and disclaimers-
would have been preferable to plaintiffs, because in theory breach
of contract meant a standard of strict (i.e., no-fault) liability. 57 The
inability to recover on a contract theory remained a form of im-
munity for mass market manufacturers from 1916 to 1958. 158 An
indication of this immunity is the fact that insurance premiums for
147. It was issued three years after Ford opened his assembly line and appeared to shift
the liability standard from no liability to negligence. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1050.
148. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 17, at 683.
149. See Rabin, Tort Law, supra note 133, at 7-8.
150. Id. at 8.
151. See Richard Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law, 10 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2193, 2199 (1989).
152. See id. at 2200.
153. See Schwartz, New Products, supra note 137, at 798.
154. See id.
155. See Croley & Hansen, supra note 16, at 697.
156. See Wade, supra note 134, at 11 (noting early products liability line of authority that
tended toward strict liability but was cut off by development of negligence); see also Galligan,
supra note 105, at 467. This kind of immunity was not a necessary outcome, occasioned by
the immaturity of doctrine and/or social and legal thinking. Even before MacPherson, there
were decisions imposing strict liability for one mass marketed product: food for human con-
sumption. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 43 N.E. 163 (Ohio 1896) (interpreting an Ohio food
products statute that no knowledge of adulteration of the product necessary to incur liabil-
ity); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. b (1965).
157. See Schwartz, New Products, supra note 137, at 801-02.
158. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 17, § 97, at 690.
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product liability remained flat in the decades that followed
Macpherson."'59
4. Backlash-The backlash in the mass production industry
came from judges and legal academics.60 For example, in a power-
ful concurrence in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,16 1 Justice Traynor
of the California Supreme Court articulated the theory of strict
products liability. He based his argument in large part on a sense
of innate justice. 62 Legal academics in the 1940s and 1950s also
emphasized ideas of fairness; their discussion of contracts of adhe-
sion would strongly influence the court in Henningsen, a case that
marked doctrinal change. 163 There was also a shift in viewing prod-
uct injuries: they were regarded less as "accidents" and more "as an
inevitable consequence of routine activities." 64 This change called
for a corollary change from notions of fault to notions of stricter
liability indifferent to morality-based corrective justice concepts.
65
In other words, there was a call for greater accountability through
enterprise liability.
5. Doctrinal Change and New Accountability-Doctrinal change in
this industry took place both in the subsidiary rules and in the li-
ability standard itself. The subsidiary rules changed gradually. 66 For
example, beginning with the American Law Institute's promulga-
tion of the Restatement of Torts in 1934, 67 courts more willingly
applied negligence principles to product design, in addition to
product defects.'8 Also, in 1944, the Supreme Court of California
permitted the use of res ipsa loquitor for product defect cases, re-
lieving plaintiffs of having to prove one element of their tort
actions. 69 These changes in the subsidiary rules created a system
with a pro-plaintiff tendency that valued full accountability, even
159. See Epstein, supra note 151, at 2199.
160. We have been unable to find substantial evidence of a popular backlash.
161. 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944).
162. See id. at 443-44.
163. See Epstein, supra note 151, at 2200-01; see also Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion--Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 631-32 (1943).
164. Rabin, Tort Law, supra note 133, at 8-9, 12.
165. See id. at 12.
166. See Schwartz, New Products, supra note 137, at 799-804 (describing process of grad-
ual change). Schwartz argues that it was not strict liability itself, but the demise of subsidiary
rules (contributory negligence, assumption of risk) and the extension of the duty to warn of
design defects that has resulted in the pro-plaintiff, full-accountability posture of post-19 6 0 s
products liability law. See id. at 802-03.
167. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 398 (1934).
168. See Schwartz, New Products, supra note 137, at 799-800 (describing development of
new theories of recovery).
169. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 438-39 (Cal. 1944).
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before the more abrupt changes in liability standard that occurred
at the beginning of the sixties. 7
The revolutionary changes of the 1960s arose most prominently
in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.171 In Henningsen, the court
held both a manufacturer and a dealer strictly liable by finding an
implied warranty between the manufacturer and the consumer,
despite the lack of privity172 Equally, if not more importantly, the
court also refused to enforce a disclaimer of liability. 7 3 Among the
reasons the New Jersey Supreme Court gave for its decision were
the changed conditions of production and distribution associated
with the maturing mass production field, including the economic
and informational power imbalances.174 Within three years the
"implied warranty" approach essentially gave way to strict liability in
tort. 175 Strict liability, of course, was accountability at its extreme.
The shift between warranty and tort says something about legal
change. First, it addressed the needs of the courts by providing a
176doctrine that was "more adaptable" than contract, much as oc-
curred in railroads, with the use of terms like proximate cause and
foreseeability. Second, it simplified matters for the court by jetti-
soning doctrinal baggage associated with contract.177 In light of
what we have seen, it is not surprising that at the maturity of the
mass production industry, courts would turn from warranty
(contract) rules which had been developed with an eye to the pur-
poses of commercial transactions, to enterprise liability in tort that
had other goals. 18 Such goals included accounting for lack of con-
sumer information about defects, loss spreading, and the difficulty
of determining which injuries are attributable to product defects. 79
Nor is it surprising that with greater accountability we also see a
170. See Schwartz, New Products, supra note 137, at 804-06.
171. 161 A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960).
172. See id. at 84. Although the concept of implied warranty has its origins in warranty
(contract) law, it is really quasi-contractual and somewhat tort-like, in the sense that the
"implied warranty" is not found "in" the contract but rather in the law of contract. However,
prior to Henningsen, implied warranties could be negated by disclaimers (unlike tort rules in
the usual case). See KEETON ET AL., supra note 17, at 690-91.
173. See Croley & Hansen, supra note 16, at 699-700.
174. See Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 78-79.
175. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 17, § 98, at 692-93 (offering three reasons for the
change).
176. Id. at 693.
177. See id.
178. See Croley & Hansen, supra note 16, at 701.
179. See generally Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965) (explaining bases for expanding manufacturer's liabil-
ity). Loss spreading in particular marks an intellectual shift from Holmes' statement that the
general policy of law is to let loss lie where it falls. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
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move toward judicial flexibility. This move is apparent in the
choice of strict liability through flexible tort doctrine rather than
strict liability through implied warranty, which might have con-
strained courts with the baggage of contract doctrine.
V. THE MANAGED CARE STORY
A. Introduction
Prepaid health care has been around since the colonial period,
but only since the late 1980s has it achieved any widespread suc-
cess. Before the late 1980s, fee-for-service medicine was the
dominant paradigm. In fee-for-service medicine, patients paid fees
for each visit and service provided. Financing was provided either
by the patient or, more typically after World War II, through the
patient's employer by a third-party commercial indemnity insurer.
As an industry, fee-for-service medicine was hostile to the idea of
prepaid health care,' 80 a hostility reflected in part by laws
prohibiting the corporate practice of medicine.'8 ' In fee-for-service
medicine, neither patients, who were insured, nor physicians, who
controlled the allocation of resources, had any incentives to limit
services or costs.
Managed care revolutionized this paradigm by combining the
financing and health care delivery aspects in one system. s2 Instead
of paying a fee for each service, a patient subscribes to a managed
care plan for a monthly fee that covers a defined set of benefits.
For each visit or service, patients make an additional co-payment of
five or ten dollars. At the heart of managed care is the promise that
this approach could lower costs by imposing restraints on the
amount of care provided without sacrificing quality of care. To do
so, managed care initiated the widespread use of cost-containment
techniques, ranging from aggressive utilization management
(either prospective, concurrent, or retrospective) to selective con-
tracting with providers. 8 3 While these techniques are now also used
180. See Emily Friedman, Capitation, Integration, and Managed Care: Lessons from Early Ex-
periments, 275 JAMA 957, 959 (1996) (noting that although corporate practice acts were not
originally aimed at MCOs, they were used to discourage their operation).
181. See id.
182. This is a far more transformative departure than the shift from in-office physician
care to hospitals as the locus of health care delivery, because it changes all aspects of the
health care enterprise. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Meml. Hosp., 211 N.E.2d
253, 257 (Ill. 1965).
183. See generallyJacobson, Legal Challenges, supra note 3.
SUMMER 1999]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 32:4
by commercial insurers, managed care providers have been much
more aggressive in using them to reduce costs.
B. Setting the Stage
As recently as the late 1960s and early 1970s, health care litiga-
tion was dominated by medical liability claims governed by a
reasonably stable set of legal rules.1 84 Both sides could predict the
nature and scope of the litigation because the essential rules estab-
lishing the standard of care and the types of litigation initiated
varied little during this period. ls' A typical court case involved one
patient suing one physician, guided by liability rules that reflected
judicial deference to physicians in setting the standard of care.186
Although there were constant complaints from physicians about
the intrusiveness of medical malpractice law and an incipient rise
in medical liability claims, litigation was confined largely to the
caregiver-patient relationship. 8"
Several legal scholars have argued persuasively that throughout
this period a symbiotic relationship existed between law and medi-
cine, with the courts actually upholding physician dominance over
health care delivery and acting as a conduit for the expansion of
the medical industry. In this sense, the courts reinforced what has
been termed the professional dominance model (where physicians
essentially controlled the health care delivery system) . This con-
cept meant that courts generally deferred to the treating
physician's judgment in deciding what services should be provided
and how the clinical encounter should be conducted.8 9 Both case
law and legislation prohibited the corporate practice of medi-
cine, 90 sharply reducing the ability of alternative organizational
forms, such as prepaid health care, to expand.
1
In most states, prior to the mid-1960s, charitable immunity pre-
vented the patient from suing the hospital for medical injuries
occurring there. 92 Reflecting changes in how health care was deliv-
184. SeeJacobson, Medical Malpractice, supra note 2, at 3323, 3325.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See generally Peter D. Jacobson & Edward Goldman, Health Care and the Law: How
It's Changed and Why It Matters (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).




192. See id. at 4.
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ered, namely the increasing importance of the hospital as the cen-
ter of health care delivery, courts began adapting medical liability
principles to hospitals. Following the precedent-setting case of Dar-
ling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital'93 in 1965, courts
around the country began to impose liability on hospitals for ac-
tions that were previously the exclusive domain of physicians.
94
C. Applying the Model
1. Birth of an Industry-In March 1970, the Nixon administra-
tion decided to offer an HMO option under Medicare and
Medicaid. After various stops and starts, Congress passed the
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973,' designed in part
to require employers covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act to
offer an HMO option to their employees. Although the Nixon ad-
ministration had ambitious plans for the new health care financing
option, the bill initially hobbled the HMOs with regulation.' 96 Con-
sequently, growth was slow. 97 Meanwhile, political pressure to
reduce the increasingly exorbitant cost of health care continued to
mount,198 and in 1978 Congress amended the laws to increase fed-
eral aid to HMOs. '9 In this climate, managed care began to
flourish, first in specific regions of the country such as California,
the upper Midwest, and certain cities in the Northeast, and then in
a broader fashion. 00 The expansion of managed care coincided
with a political and intellectual push for less regulation and a
"market-based" approach to health policy and health care deliv-
ery.21' By the mid to late 1980s, health care delivery was shifting
from a cottage industry dominated by medical professionals and
non-market-based (charitable) considerations to an industry
193. 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965).
194. See id. at 253.
195. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-300e-17 (1973).
196. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 407
(1982).
197. See id. at 407-08.
198. See id. at 411-17.
199. See Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury: Rethinking Liabil-
ity, 31 GA. L. REV. 419, 429 (1997).
200. SeeSTARR, supra note 196, at 415.
201. See id. at 418-19. As Professor Havighurst has noted, "[a]Ihhough the legal system
originally bolstered the old medical regime and embodied most of its tenets, changes in
legal rules and doctrine eventually contributed to the old system's demise and its replace-
ment by a more chaotic, partly market-driven system." CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL.,
HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY, at xii (2d ed. 1998).
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increasingly guided by traditional market rules and arrange-
ments.202 Correspondingly, health care law has moved from an
exploration of the caregiver-patient relationship (primarily around
medical liability) to a set of rules governing the entire method of
delivering and paying for health care.203 The result is a nearly com-
plete transfer of power within the health care industry from
doctors to corporate managed care entities.0 4
2. Mismatch and Confusion-The changes in the health care en-
vironment have inevitably resulted in a new set of issues to be
litigated. New features of the managed care environment raise
novel issues likely to emerge, particularly the conflict between
population-based cost containment and access for individual sub-
scribers (sometimes to experimental procedures), the multiplicity
of actors in a given case, and the evolving nature of the organiza-
tional structures.20' Just as the courts had to adapt medical liability
principles to hospitals,0 6 the same process is now underway with
regard to the emerging organizational forms comprising managed
care.20 7 There is inevitably a learning curve as courts become edu-
cated about the underlying changes and begin to adapt principles
derived for a different model to the new arrangements. For exam-
ple, instead of the simple model of litigation involving one
physician and one patient, managed care litigation may include
the patient, the physician, the health plan, the utilization review
firm, and the administrator of an ERISA-covered plan.08 Sorting
out which party is legally responsible for delayed or denied care
and determining the acceptable level of care resulting from cost
containment strategies remains a work in progress.
Courts are only recently becoming comfortable with the idea
that MCOs are more than financiers of health care (that is, as enti-
ties which provide mixed functions as insurer and provider) .20 The
202. SeeJacobson & Goldman, supra note 187, at 10.
203. See id. at 1.
204. See STARR, supra note 196, at 428. See generallyJacobson & Goldman, supra note 187.
205. SeeJacobson, Legal Challenges, supra note 3, at 71.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 193-94.
207. See id.
208. See, e.g., Danca v. Emerson Hosp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 27, 29 (D. Mass. 1998)
(challenging liability claim against an insurer, a claims administrator, two hospitals, and
three physicians).
209. Compare Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1137, 1139 n.2
(E.D. Va. 1997) (stating that HMOs perform two "independent" functions), with Corcoran v.
United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331-34 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting the functions are
inextricably intertwined), Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 956 F. Supp. 129, 140 (D. Conn. 1997)
(stating that medical benefits plan administrators necessarily make medical decisions), affd.
in relevant part, 137 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 1998), and Murphy v. Board of Med. Exam'rs, 949 P.2d
530, 538 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that MCO decisions are medical, not financial).
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symptoms of discomfort and lack of familiarity showed early on:
courts routinely referred to MCOs and prepaid health plans as
"insurance" and seemed unsure how to characterize utilization re-
view for liability purposes. '0 As late as 1991, courts felt it necessary
to define in their opinions what exactly this strange beast known as
a "health maintenance organization" was.
2 1 1
McClellan v. Health Maintenance Organization of Pennsylvania1
2
demonstrates one court's uneasiness with the HMO concept.2 1 3 The
case addressed whether an independent practice association
(IPA)21' fell within the statutory definition of a professional health
care provider for purposes of a motion to compel the disclosure of
certain documents to ascertain liability.215 The court upheld the
lower court's decision that an IPA did not meet the statutory defi-
nition.2 " The judges voting to affirm viewed the IPA strictly in
relation to the older forms of health care delivery, stating that an
IPA cannot be regarded as a health care provider because it
"cannot oversee patient care within its walls."2 7 In contrast, one of
the three dissenting judges noted that this conclusion "ignores the
reality of health care today."2 1 8 A corporation operating a health
care facility may not be in a place where it can oversee patient care
"within its walls."
219
In the context of utilization review (UR) ,2 courts also seem un-
able to come to grips with the reality that utilization review entails
clinical decision making. 21 For this reason, they either deny that
210. Compare Wota v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 820 P.2d 1137 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991)
(referring to prepaid health plan as "insurance" throughout), with DONALD K. FREEBORN &
CLYDE R. POPE, PROMISE AND PRFORMANCE IN MANAGED CARE: THE PREPAID GROUP PRAC-
TICE MODEL 53 (1994) ("When people join an HMO, they are not just buying health
insurance. They are buying access to a health care system and have a contractual right to
medically necessary services.").
211. See Chase v. Independent Practice Ass'n, 583 N.E.2d 251, 252 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct.
1991) (defining a health maintenance organization as "an entity that both insures for the
cost and provides for the delivery of health care services, through negotiated contractual
arrangements with selected hospitals and physicians, to a defined, voluntarily enrolled pa-
tient population ... in exchange for periodic, prepaid, per capita premiums").
212. 686A.2d 801 (Pa. 1996).
213. See id.
214. An IPA is a group of physicians (such as a multi-specialty group) that contracts with
managed care firms and commercial insurers to provide medical services.
215. See McClellan, 686 A.2d at 804.
216. See id. at 806-07.
217. Id. at 806.
218. Id. at 809 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
219. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
220. See Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 50 n.9 (D. Mass. 1997)
("Utilization review refers to an external evaluation of the appropriateness of a given course
of treatment based upon established clinical criteria.").
221. SeeJacobson, Legal Challenges, supra note 3, at 75-76.
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UR decisions are medical,222 or they recognize the hybrid nature of
UR but hold that the administrative aspect trumps the medical as-
pect.223 Furthermore, in reviewing plan decisions to deny treatment
under ERISA, for example, courts have employed flawed thinking
with regard to conflict-of-interest analysis. 24 That is, courts have
failed to acknowledge the shift from individual patient-physician
relationships to multi-entity disputes that focus on patient popula-
tions.2 25 As we will see below, both confusions have benefited MCOs
by shielding them from liability.
Perhaps the primary doctrinal mismatch has been the attempt to
apply liability principles derived under fee-for-service medicine to
managed care. For health care litigation, traditional legal doctrine
conforms to a medical practice regime dominated by fee-for-service
medicine in which the physician's preeminent concern is for the
individual patient.226 In a managed care environment, that individ-
ual relationship must be balanced with the allocation of plan
resources to the entire patient population. Conflicts emerge when
patients' desires for unlimited care clash with managed care cost
containment initiatives. As several scholars have noted, these cases
are conceptually different from the traditional liability principles.2
3. Period of Immunity-Managed care can harm patients by plac-
ing limits on access to hospital and specialty care, making poor
drug choices, delaying diagnosis, and denying care.28 From a liabil-
ity perspective, MCOs face the same risks as insurance companies,
i.e., litigation over what is covered and excluded. MCOs, however,
face additional potential liability for the conduct of their employ-
ees and bureaucratic structure in, among other things, UR
decision making, and they face potential vicarious or direct liability
for the actions of their physicians in terms of malpractice. m
222. See generallyJass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that utilization review is a benefits determination under ERISA).
223. See Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992).
224. See E. Haavi Morreim, Benefits Decisions in ERISA Plans: Diminishing Deference to Fidu-
ciaries and an Emerging Problem for Provider-Sponsored Organizations, 65 TENN. L. REv. 511, 523-
33 (1998) (arguing that courts wrongly construe conflicts of interests to exist where they are
more accurately described as conflicts of interest and conflicts of obligation-the former
involving a conflict between fiduciaries' duties to beneficiaries and their personal welfare;
the latter, a conflict between fiduciaries' duties to individual beneficiaries and their duties to
other beneficiaries).
225. SeeJacobson & Goldman, supra note 187, at 12-13.
226. See id.
227. See, e.g., E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine Meets Resource Limits: Restructuring the Legal
Standard of Care, 59 U. Prir. L. REv. 1, 17 (1997); E. Haavi Morreim, Stratified Scarcity: Rede-
fining the Standard of Care, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 356, 358 (1989).
228. See Furrow, supra note 199, at 425.
229. See id. at 443-44.
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Court decisions have generally favored MCOs' attendant cost
containment initiatives, implicitly, and sometimes even explicitly,
assuming that the MCOs are legal, desirable, and favored by publicS 230
policy. For example, in Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., the court
rejected the claim that incentive arrangements with physicians
were violative of ERISA per se because such a holding would ren-
der managed care illegal-a result the court found absurd given
federal and state laws encouraging managed care. In Hartmann v.
232Northern Services, Inc., the court assumed the underlying legality of
managed care to defeat a claim using a curiously circular argument
with a three-part syllogism: every plan does it this way, every plan
cannot be illegal, therefore this plan is not illegal .
The courts' confusion and the identification of policies favoring
managed care have given MCOs a partial immunity from liability.
Like the railroads' immunity, managed care's immunity is not com-
plete. Rather, liability for familiar functions remains nearly the same,
much like common carrier liability did in the railroad context. In the
managed care context, for instance, courts appear generally unsym-
pathetic to HMOs in regard to the familiar insurance-type
functions,2 3 4 except that, on account of ERISA's not-very-demanding
breach of fiduciary duty rule, courts give a great deal of deference to
an MCO's interpretation of policy terms and exclusions when the
MCO is operating in conjunction with an ERISA-covered health
plan.235
Just as we have already seen with railroads and mass production,
early MCO cases provided considerable doctrinal immunity. We
will explore three specific case types where courts protected the
emerging cost containment innovations: ERISA, antitrust, and the
corporate practice of medicine.
a. ERISA-ERISA has served as a liability shield for MCOs that
contract with employers to provide health care for beneficiaries of
230. 972 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
231. See id. at 753.
232. No. CI-96-135, 1996 WL 438810 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 1996).
233. See id. at *3. In concept, this is similar to Bovbjerg's argument that the standard of
care for an MCO should be the care provided by a similar MCO. See RandallJ. Bovbjerg, The
Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and Customary Practice, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1375, 1408-
09 (1975).
234. See Furrow, supra note 199, at 447-48; see also Davis v. Selectcare, Inc., 834 F. Supp.
197, 198 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (adopting contra proferentem as a matter of federal common law in
an MCO case).
235. See, e.g., Reinert v. Giorgio Foods, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 589, 595 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(employing very deferential review of a decision to deny benefits and an interpretation of
plan terms); Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 53, 57 (1st. Cir. 1999) (citing "reasonability"
of denial as the basic touchstone).
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employee welfare benefit plans.2 6 According to recent Department
of Labor estimates, ERISA applies to approximately 125 million
Americans covered by employer-sponsored health plans.23 ' Because
so much of the population is enrolled in ERISA plans, immunity
under ERISA amounts to immunity for a significant portion of• 231
managed care business.
It is important to note that we are not simply claiming that the
statutes favor MCOs, but rather that courts, given a choice between
interpretations that favor MCOs and interpretations that allocate
additional liability to MCOs, inevitably have chosen the favorable
approach. 239 This choice has been based, at least in part, on a per-
ception of public policy as favoring MCOs.
24 °
ERISA limits liability through three statutory provisions: its pre-
emption clause, its scheme of limited remedies, and the limited
nature of the fiduciary duties it imposes on MCOs. 2 4' The primary
immunity mechanism is ERISA's preemption clause,242 which has
largely insulated MCOs from liability under state tort law despite
the numerous theories under which plaintiffs have sought recov-
ery.243 Because of preemption, for instance, utilization review
236. See Scott D. Pomfret, Emerging Theories of Liability for Utilization Review Under ERISA
Health Plans, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 131,131 (1998).
237. See Federal Legislation Relating to Health Care Quality: Hearing Before Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. 2d. Sess. (1998) (statement of Meredith Miller,
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration).
238. See id.
239. See Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function and Managed Care Torts:
Achieving Fairness and Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence, 35 Hous. L. REv. 985, 1023 (1998)
[hereinafterJacobson & Pomfret, Managed Care Torts] (describing interpretive missteps and
alternatives of ERISA analysis).
240. It is possible to argue that courts are much more constrained by statutes here than
in the common law railroad era, and that is of course true. But the self-perception has
changed, perhaps more so than the reality. The kind of decision that was perceived as "for
the legislative arena" perhaps has also changed. Thus, the rise of a less active, or possibly less
political, judiciary was timed with the rise, possibly statute driven, of managed care to pro-
duce the constrained effect. We argue, however, that even within this restriction, courts,
when faced with interpretive choices, seemed to choose the one favoring managed care.
241. See Peter Jacobson & Scott Pomfret, ERISA Litigation and Physician Autonomy,
(1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors) [hereinafterJacobson & Pomfret,
Physician Autonomy].
242. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
243. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United HealthCare Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1329-33 (5th Cir.
1992) (arguing improper UR); Farlow v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 874 F.2d 791 (11th Cir.
1989) (alleging fraudulent misrepresentation of the terms of health care coverage contract);
Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997) (alleging
negligence under state law for the establishment and operation of an "Incentive Program"
that encouraged physicians not to prescribe certain expensive tests and not to refer); Dukes
v. United States Health Care Sys., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (arguing malpractice
on a theory of vicarious liability), rev'd, Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.
1995); Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health Inc., 753 F. Supp. 61, 63-65 (D. Conn. 1990) (holding
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decisions are rarely subject to state tort law,244 and until 1995,
medical malpractice liability on a theory of ostensible agency was
also often subject to preemption. 45
Injured patients fare no better with claims under ERISA's fiduci-
ary duty clause,4 6 which is limited in scope. The combination of the
preemption clause and this limited obligation means that a change
in an MCO's physician compensation arrangement-no matter
how disruptive of the physician patient-relationship-may not be
challenged under state law24' as a breach of ERISA's fiduciary du-
ties.24 ' Likewise, courts generally are not particularly aggressive in
using the breach of fiduciary duty clause to assess liability for im-
proper denial of benefits.
2 49
Even in those instances where personal injury claims have been
brought under ERISA as a claim for an improper denial of bene-
fits, courts have read the remedial provisions so narrowly that only
extremely limited remedies are available. 50 Often, injured claim-
ants are left with no remedy at all, 251 and MCOs thus are legally
that ERISA preempts negligent supervision claim against HMO); see also Karen A. Jordan,
Travelers Insurance: New Support for the Argument to Restrain ERISA Preemption, 13 YALE J. ON
REG. 255, 259-60, 271-72 (1996) (discussing state actions in the health care field that lower
courts have held to be preempted by ERISA).
244. See Pomfret, supra note 236, at 131.
245. See, e.g., Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125, 129-30 (D.N.J. 1994) (holding that ERISA
preempts state law tort claim premised on vicarious liability); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F.
Supp. 316, 317-18 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that ERISA preempts claim alleging HMO's
vicarious liability for medical malpractice); Altieri, 753 F. Supp. at 64 (preempting all of
plaintiffs state action claims because of ERISA).
246. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994).
247. SeeJacobson, Legal Challenges, supra note 3, at 72-75.
248. See Maltz v. Aetna Health Plans, Inc., 114 F.3d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding
that HMOs' changing method of compensation for physicians from fee-for-service to capita-
tion did not breach any fiduciary duty to enrollee).
249. See, e.g., Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 150 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 1998)
(declining to award damages for breaches of fiduciary duty under ERISA's equitable reme-
dies provision).
250. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 260 (1993). Commentators have
blasted this narrow misreading of the statute. See, e.g., George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Extracon-
tractual Damages Mandated for Benefit Claims Actions, 36 ARiz. L. REv. 611, 624-25 (1994);
Andrea Koutoulogenis, The Invisible Man: A Call to Empower Individual Participants and Benefi-
ciaries Against Fiduciary Breaches in ERISA Plans, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 553, 556 (1998);
Dana M. Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise?, 81 IowA L. Rav. 1, 30
(1995); Richard Rouco, Available Remedies Under ERISA Section 502(A), 45 ALA. L. REv. 631,
632-33 (1994). It is another example of where, given the choice, courts chose immunity in
the form of limited remedies over a more beneficent interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage.
251. See, e.g., Bast, 150 F.3d at 1007-11 (holding that ERISA preempted state law claims,
even though there was no ERISA remedy).
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unaccountable for their conduct.252 We have demonstrated exten-
sively elsewhere that this shield of immunity was not a necessary
outcome of ERISA's statutory language or structure but rather the
product of the Supreme Court's interpretive choices, which have
favored the managed care industry. 53 The courts were citing a pol-
icy for this immunity-that permitting such suits would raise costs
and perhaps keep employers from offering any benefits at all254 -
which had been largely abandoned in the retreat from charitable
immunity in the medical field.255 Such resurrection of moribund
doctrine poignantly recalls the railroad-era courts' resurrection of
211the wrongful death statute.
b. Antitrust-In the new health care order, physicians have at-
tempted to use antitrust doctrine through private litigation to
block cost containment initiatives, and competing organizations
have attempted to use antitrust doctrine to force competitors to
open their physician panels to competition. Neither effort has
generated much support in the courts, thus creating a second
source of protection from liability.
First, courts have dismissed antitrust actions attacking selective
contracting and the like, with explicit deference to the managed
care form. In Ambroze v. Aetna Health Plans of New York, Inc. , for
instance, anesthesiologists brought a restraint of trade action un-
der Section 1 of the Sherman Act, challenging the defendant's
exclusive contracting arrangement with another physicians'
258group. After determining that a valid antitrust violation had not
been alleged, the court attacked the heart of the plaintiffs' case:
[I]t is worth repeating the fact that the plaintiffs' principal
target here ... is the very concept of managed care.... The
252. See Clark C. Havighurst, Making Health Plans Accountable for the Quality of Care, 31
GA. L. REv. 587, 589 (1997) (arguing that, to date, "most MCOs have opportunistically
sought to manipulate legal rules to insulate themselves from such liability").
253. SeeJacobson & Pomfret, Managed Care Torts, supra note 239, at 989-90.
254. See, e.g., Rice v. Panchal, 875 F. Supp. 471, 473 (N.D. Ill. 1994), rev'd, 65 F.3d 637
(7th Cir. 1995) (remanding the case to state courts for lack of federal subject matter juris-
diction).
255. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 17, § 133, at 1070 (discussing abrogation of charita-
ble immunity doctrine).
256. See supra text accompanying note 86. Interestingly, but hopefully coincidentally,
courts have interpreted ERISA, too, to prohibit dead persons or their relatives from suing
under its remedial provisions, see Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc., 953 F.
Supp. 419, 424-25 (D. Mass. 1997), thereby making it less expensive for an MCO to kill you
than to maim you, much like in the old railroad days. See Friedman, supra note 23, at 473-74.
257. No. 95 Civ. 6631, 1996 WL 282069 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1996), vacated on other grounds,
107 F.3d 2 (2d Cir. 1997).
258. See id. at *4-5.
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fact that HMOs have their critics does not obligate the courts
to create.., a novel application of the antitrust laws....
U] udicial restraint in this highly charged area of law and pol-
259icy is the best recourse.
Second, courts have given MCOs wide authority to determine
staff privileges, an area now dominated by contractual
interpretations.2 60 MCOs have argued that an important aspect of
controlling health care costs is limiting the number of physicians
that are eligible to participate in the plan and applying economic
criteria to staff selection and retention decisions. For the most
part, courts have sanctioned the use of economic credentialing and
the use of selective contracting. In Maltz v. Aetna Health Plans,61 for
example, the court upheld an MCO's change in network physicians
solely for cost containment reasons, despite the disruption to long-
term physician-patient relationships. 62 In this instance, physician-
patient autonomy yielded to cost containment dictates.
There has also been a decline in per se analysis of the antitrust
laws, expressly because courts do not have much experience in
263dealing with new managed care organizational forms. Instead,
courts have focused on using the rule of reason analysis, 64 in part
responding to the guidelines issued by the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission. 65 Often, a rule of reason
analysis means no antitrust liability, especially in merger cases.26
As we have seen with the other industries, however, immunity is
not complete. An important issue confronted by antitrust cases is
how to characterize MCOs for purposes of defining the relevant
product markets to analyze competition. Two recent cases have
ruled that MCOs (either HMOs or IPAs) do not constitute a sepa-
rate health care market for antitrust analysis, in part because
259. Id. at *10 (citation omitted).
260. SeeJacobson, Legal Challenges, supra note 3, at 78.
261. 114 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1997).
262. See id. at 12.
263. See Levine v. Central Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538, 1550 (11th Cir. 1996);
Retina Assoc. v. Southern Baptist Hosp., Inc., 105 F.3d 1376, 1382 (11th Cir. 1997).
264. For a full discussion of "rule of reason" analysis, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FED-
ERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 226-40 (1994) (comparing per se and rule of reason analysis).
265. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST EN-
FORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996).
266. In general, courts have applied traditional antitrust principles to health care mar-
kets, see generally, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier: Hospital
Mergers and Antitrust Law, 23 AM.J.L. & MED. 191 (1997), helping to stimulate the movement
toward more efficient organizational forms. Recent merger decisions, along with the federal
antitrust guidelines, for instance, have focused on systems integration and economic effi-
ciencies to determine whether an activity violates the antitrust laws.
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physicians have other market alternatives for selling their services
to insurers and MCOs. 267 These cases indicate that courts are not
protecting MCOs from other providers (and vice versa) or from
competitive pressures in the health care market.
c. Other Immunities-For cases outside of ERISA, MCOs suffer
greater potential liability,268 but immunity has been achieved in
other ways, such as through laws barring the corporate practice of
medicine. Originally enacted at a time when corporate provision of
medical care was thought unethical 269 and used to preserve physi-
cians' power within the medical field, these laws have been used to
shield MCOs from liability. In Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc.-
270Healthamerica Corp., for example, plaintiff sued HMO Health
America for negligent treatment.2 7' The court dismissed the suit on
the grounds that because the HMO was legally barred from the
practice of medicine it could not be sued for medical malpractice
272under a theory of ostensible agency. This logic is, to put it chari-
tably, suspect.
Recently, however, courts have begun to reconsider the corpo-
rate practice of medicine doctrine. For example, in Berlin v. Sarah
Bush Lincoln Health Center,73 the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that
the doctrine no longer retained viability, despite still appearing on
the books.274 As such, the court refused to invoke the doctrine to
void a contract between a physician and the health plan.275 Just as
important, the court recognized that the organization of health
care into large integrated systems rendered the corporate practice
of medicine doctrine obsolete.
267. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1411 (7th
Cir. 1995); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 598 (1st Cir. 1993)
("One can monopolize a product as either a seller or a buyer; but as a buyer of doctor serv-
ices, Healthsource could never achieve a monopoly (monopsony is the technical term),
because doctors have too many alternative buyers for their services.").
268. See Wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Ct. App. 1986) (permitting
MCOs to be held accountable when "medically inappropriate decisions result from defects
in the design or implementation of cost containment mechanisms as, for example, when
appeals made on a patient's behalf for medical or hospital care are arbitrarily ignored or
unreasonably disregarded or overridden"); Petrovich v. Share Health Plan, Inc., 696 N.E.2d
356, 360-64 (Ill. App. 1998) (permitting vicarious liability malpractice suits against MCOs in
appropriate circumstances).
269. SeeJacobson & Goldman, supra note 187, at 17.
270. 743 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App. 1987).
271. See id. at 374.
272. See id. at 378.
273. 688 N.E.2d 106 (Ill. 1997).
274. See id. at 112-13.
275. See id. at 114.
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4. Backlash-Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century,
the once nascent managed care industry is maturing. Managed
care has become the dominant approach to providing health
care. 2 7 Even many indemnity plans have adopted managed care
cost-containment techniques. 7  Consolidation among existing
MCOs has created tremendous economic power.27s In some areas,
MCOs "have aggregated to the point that some are moving toward
monopoly.
2 7 9
Backlash has followed. Studies have appeared that compare
quality of care in MCOs with fee-for-service medicine. Patients
have reported increasing dissatisfaction with MCOs.2s Doctors and
nurses suggest that proper care has taken a backseat to corporate
2812 283profits. The press has joined the bandwagon.
In the legislative arena, Congress has begun to consider legisla-
tion that removes MCO immunity. In the Senate, the Patient
Access to Responsible Care Act of 1997 (still being debated in
Congress as of this writing) contains a provision amending ERISA's
express preemption clause to prevent courts from "preclud[ing]
any State cause of action to recover damages for personal injury or
wrongful death against any person that provides insurance or ad-
ministrative services to or for an employee welfare benefit plan.28s
President Clinton has contributed to the discussion by directing
federal agencies to implement a Patient Bill of Rights for partici-
pants in Medicare, Medicaid, and various other federal health
insurance programs.2 8 6 Legal scholars have criticized the MCOs'
favored position in the ERISA doctrine.8 7
276. See Jon Gabel, Ten Ways HMOs Have Changed During the 1990s, HEALTH ALT.,
May/June 1997, at 134.
277. See id.
278. See id. at 138.
279. Friedman, supra note 180, at 960.
280. See Gabel, supra note 276, at 144.
281. See id.
282. See, e.g., The Ad Hoc Committee to Defend Health Care, For Our Patients, Not for
Profits: A Call to Action, 278JAMA 1733 (1997).
283. See, e.g., GeorgeJ. Church, Backlash Against HMOs, TIME, Apr. 14, 1997, at 32.
284. See 67 U.S.L.W. 2479 (1999) (describing current legislative effect in this regard).
285. Patient Access to Responsible Care Act of 1997, S. 644, 105th Cong. § 4 (1997).
286. See Memorandum on Federal Agency Compliance with the Patient Bill of Rights,
34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 298 (Feb. 23, 1998); see also Robert Pear, Clinton Orders Rights
Action in Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1998, atA7.
287. See generally Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
619 (1994) (arguing that current law is based on flawed assumptions of ERISA's preemption
provision); Joseph F. Cunningham, ERISA: Some Thoughts on Unfulfilled Promises, 49 ARK L.
REv. 83 (1996) (arguing that federal courts wrongly associate ERISA preemption with a lack
of any court remedy at all); Torin A. Dorros & T. Howard Stone, Implications of Negligent
Selection and Retention of Physicians in an Age of ERISA, 21 AM.J.L. & MED. 383 (1995) (arguing
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Without significantly changing ERISA doctrine, courts have
been a vocal part of the backlash. For example, court opinions-
"in light of modern health care"2ss-have begun to condemn laws
which insulate MCOs from liability, especially for improper utiliza-
tion review or other practices that delay or deny medically
necessary care. Skeptics on the bench have denounced the ef-
fects of ERISA preemption:
This [result], of course, is ridiculous. The tragic events set
forth in [Plaintiff's] Complaint cry out for relief.... Under
traditional notions of justice, the harms alleged-if true-
should entitle [Plaintiff] to some legal remedy.... Neverthe-
less, this Court had no choice but to pluck [Plaintiffs] case
out of the state court in which she sought redress ... and
then, at the behest of [Defendant MCO], to slam the court-
house doors in her face and leave her without any remedy.90
Some courts have seemed to criticize the "management" aspect of
medical care in general. 9'
5. Change in Doctrine?--Consistent with the backlash-and our
model-there have been hints that courts are changing the doc-
trine in ways that may result in greater accountability for managed
care organizations. For example, after years of interpreting ERISA
preemption broadly, the Supreme Court in New York State Confer-
ence of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.
292
permitted New York State to impose a tax on all insurers except
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, reasoning that a uniform tax only tan-
2993gentially relates to ERISA plan administration. This signaled a
scaling back of the breadth of ERISA preemption, particularly in
that ERISA ought not to preempt negligent selection and retention claims); Paul O'Neil,
Protecting EISA Health Care Claimants: Practical Assessment of a Neglected Issue in Health Care
Reform, 55 O Io ST. L.J. 723 (1994) (arguing that courts misapply ERISA by interpreting it
to protect health insurers); Larry J. Pittman, ERISA 's Preemption Clause and the Health Care
Industry: An Abdication ofJudicial Law-Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. REv. 355 (1994) (arguing
that courts should recognize limits to ERISA's broad preemption clause in the context of
medical malpractice lawsuits).
288. Pomeroy v.Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 110, 116 (D. Md. 1994).
289. See Robert Pear, Hands Tied, Judges Rue Law That Limits HMO Liability, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 1998, at Al.
290. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 52-53 (D. Mass. 1997)
(footnote omitted).
291. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 375-78 (7th Cir. 1998). Recently, the full
circuit denied review of the Herdrich decision over a forceful dissent by Judges Easterbrook,
Posner, Flaum, and Wood. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 170 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 1999).
292. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
293. See id. at 658-62.
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determining whether the challenged law or practice actually bur-
dens the administration of plan benefits or has only a remote
impact. After Travelers, lower courts have been less vigorous in
finding ERISA preemption.294
Following Travelers and largely inspired by it, lower courts have
created a critical distinction between claims addressing the quality
and those addressing the quantity of ERISA health care benefits.95
This distinction has permitted courts to find that state actions for
the vicarious liability of MCOs for medical malpractice by providers
associated with the MCO are not completely preempted by
ERISA. 296 The federal courts now remand such actions to state
court.297 Prior to the Dukes decision, federal courts had been split
on the vicarious liability issue;298 they are now uniformly against
complete preemption, which would otherwise permit federal ju-
risdiction over the suits and probable dismissal.3 0 0 Defendant
MCOs, seeking a more amenable federal forum, are therefore
likely to find their cases returned to the states. Thus, potentially
more patient-friendly state courts will decide whether such suits
"relate to" an employee benefit plan. No court has yet found such a
relation, which permits these cases to be heard on the merits. 0 ' As
a consequence, with the quality-quantity distinction-a distinction
only tenuously based in the reality of managed care decision mak-
302ing and similar narrowing of ERISA preemption doctrine, lower
courts have chipped away at the preemption shield, increasing the
likelihood of full MCO accountability to injured patients.0 3
294. See, e.g., Pappas v. Asbel, 724 A.2d 889, 893 (Pa. 1998) (finding no preemption of
state law claims against HMO, based in large part on Travelers).
295. See, e.g., Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. 57 F.3d 350, 355 (3rd Cir. 1995) (holding
that claims brought against HMO fell outside the scope of ERISA, and therefore ERISA did
not completely preempt it).
296. See id. at 355-56.
297. See id. at 361.
298. Compare, e.g., Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316, 317-18 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding
that vicarious liability claim against HMO is preempted by ERISA) with Independence HMO,
Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983, 987-89 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that action against HMO is
not preempted by ERISA).
299. See, e.g., Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820, 826 (D. Md. 1995) (concluding that
vicarious liability claims are not completely preempted).
300. See, e.g., Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1495 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that vicarious liability claim is preempted by ERISA, though not completely
preempted by civil enforcement scheme).
301. See Tufino v. New York Hotel & Motel Council & Hotel Ass'ns of the N.Y. City AFL-
CIO Local 6, 223 A.D.2d 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
302. SeeJacobson & Pomfret, Managed Care Torts, supra note 239, at 1028-29.
303. See Pomfret, supra note 236, at 131 n.2 (citing articles finding a weaker shield). In-
deed, in practice, the quantity/quality distinction is difficult to maintain. Many clinical
decisions involve both quality and quantity aspects. For instance, discharging a patient two
days early may represent a clinical decision or it may be a based on a benefits determination.
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There has also been a smattering of renegade decisions curtail-
ing MCO immunity in ways arguably inconsistent with precedent."4
To the extent these decisions are upheld,3 5 we may see new doc-
trine emerging. The scaling back of broad preemption may have
begun to erode plan immunity even for the design of a health
plan. In Moreno v. Health Partners Health Plan,°6 plaintiff alleged that
an MCO was liable for creating a "substandard" health care plan
and that she suffered from medical malpractice caused by imple-
mentation of the substandard plan.30 7 The court decided that this
state law tort action was not completely preempted and could go to
trial in the state court.38 The court said, "Congress has expressed
no desire that ERISA be used to degrade the quality of health-
,,309
care.
Preemption is not the only area where the trend toward greater
accountability may be emerging. Some courts have found a duty to
disclose to patients the financial incentives that exist between
MCOs and their physicians.310 In Shea v. Esensten,3" the court held
that the HMO's financial incentives, including incentives discour-
aging treatment referrals, constituted material facts which must be
The flexibility of this distinction may enable courts to circumvent MCO immunity in egre-
gious cases, much as courts in the nineteenth century used inherently vague tort concepts in
a flexible fashion. See supra text following note 138; see also, e.g., Hoyt v. Edge, No. Civ.A.97-
3631, 1997 WL 356324, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 1997) (characterizing MCO's negligence in
failing to supervise physician as a "quality" claim, even though it arguably involved admini-
stration of the health plan and thus had implications for nationwide administrative
uniformity); Whelan v. Keystone Health Plan E., No. CIV.A.94-5733, 1995 MWL 394153, at *4
(E.D. Pa. June 25, 1995) (remanding wrongful death and direct negligence claims against
MCO as quality claims, even though they arguably involved administrative decision making).
304. See, e.g., Washington Physicians Serv. Ass'n v. Gregoire, 147 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th
Cir. 1998) (holding that a state act which regulates a product that ERISA may buy does not
allow ERISA preemption); Corporate Health Ins. Inc. v. Texas Dept. of Ins., 12 F. Supp.2d
597, 625 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Pappas v. Asbel, 724 A.2d 889, 893 (Pa. 1998) (concluding that
"negligence claims against a health maintenance organization do not 'relate to' an ERISA
plan").
305. See Pappas, 724 A.2d at 889.
306. 4 F. Supp. 2d 888 (D. Ariz. 1998); see also Ouellette v. Christ Hosp., 942 F. Supp.
1160, 1165 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (demonstrating similar allegations and result).
307. See Moreno, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 889.
308. See id. at 893.
309. Id.
310. See Drolet v. Healthsource, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 757, 759-60 (D.N.H. 1997); see also
Muller v. Maron, No. CIV.A.94-5052, 1995 WL 605483, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1995)
(remanding claim charging fraud and misrepresentation in failing to inform patient of in-
centive arrangements to state court as not completely preempted).
311. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
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disclosed as part of ERISA's fiduciary duties. The existence ofS 313
such a duty remains controversial..
In recent years many suits charging MCO misconduct that re-
sulted in delayed or denied care have been cast as breaches of
fiduciary duty under ERISA rather than as potentially preempted314 315
state law torts.314 In Herdrich v. Pegram, the court held that a pa-
tient could sue for breach of ERISA's fiduciary duty based on an
allegation that the nature of incentive arrangements between the
MCO- and the physicians caused her to be deprived of proper
medical care and that the MCO and physician reaped economic
gain from this deprivation.1 6 Although the Herdrich court specifi-
cally noted that the existence of economic incentives would not
automatically be tantamount to a breach of fiduciary duty,"7 this case
is a potentially significant extension of the rationale advanced in
non-ERISA cases. If other courts follow and rule that the existence of
economic incentives may constitute a breach of fiduciary duty under
ERISA, these incentives will be increasingly vulnerable to legal chal-
lenge. It should be noted, however, that Herdrich represents a legal
theory which is viable only in an extreme case: "where a fiduciary
jettisons his responsibility to the physical well-being of beneficiaries
in favor of 'loyalty' to his own financial interests. '31 s No patient has
yet recovered a judgment in such a case,3'9 and the U.S. Supreme
Court has agreed to review the Herdrich decision.
Even the question of remedies has revealed hints of an emerging
judicial reluctance to stick to ERISA's strict terms. In Mertens v.
Hewitt,3 20 for example, the Supreme Court held that ERISA limited
plaintiffs' possible relief for breach of fiduciary duty to "categories
of relief that were typically available in equity (such as injunction,
312. See id. at 628-29.
313. See Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 198 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding
no duty under ERISA to disclose physician compensation arrangements); see also Weiss v.
Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 753-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
314. See Ince v. Healthsource Ark., Inc., 977 F. Supp. 948, 951 (E.D. Ark. 1997)
(permitting plaintiff whose state law claim for negligent utilization review was preempted to
amend her complaint to plead breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA).
315. 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998). In an en banc rehearing, Judge Easterbrook wrote a
vigorous dissent to the majority opinion upholding the three-judge panel's decision. See
Herdrich v. Pegram, 170 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook,J., dissenting).
316. See id. at 372-73.
317. See id. at 373.
318. Id.
319. SeePomfret, supra note 236, at 164.
320. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
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mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages) .,,31 In
Varity Corp., the Court cited Mertens favorably in regard to the ques-
tion of what relief was available to individuals suing for breach of
fiduciary duty. 2 2 Nevertheless, since Varity there has been a movetowar broaer •323
toward broader recoveries. Lower courts appear to be stretching
the limits imposed by the Court.3 2 4 As such, MCOs may not be able
to rely any longer on limited recoveries, although several federal
circuit courts have rigorously enforced the limited recoveries, re-
fusing even to force entities who make bad faith denials of
325coverage to disgorge what they should have paid for denied care.
In sum, the evidence suggests that the managed care industry is
in stage four, the backlash, and that some tentative movement to-
ward stage five is perhaps imminent. We hasten to note, however,
that there is no change as of yet. In the context of ERISA, MCOs
remain largely immune, and courts' antitrust analysis remains very
deferential to managed care arrangements.
321. Id. at 256 (emphasis in original); see also McLeod v. Oregon Lithoprint Inc., 102
F.3d 376, 378 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that "equitable relief" is limited to injunction, man-
damus, or restitution).
322. SeeVarity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996).
323. See Karl J. Stoecker, ERISA Remedies After Varity Corp. v. Howe, 9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J.
237, 253-56 (1997).
324. See generally Fotta v. Trustees of United Mine Workers of Am. Health Retirement
Fund of 1974, 67 U.S.L.W. 1392 (3d Cir. December 18, 1998) (permitting recovery of inter-
est for period of which benefit was improperly denied, even though not specifically
authorized in ERISA); Pickering v. USX Corp., Civ. Nos.87-C-8387, 88-C-763J, and 91-C-636J,
1995 WL 584372, at *34 (D. Utah May 8, 1995) (stating that relief is restitutionary and thus
equitable in nature where it "restore[s] the status quo and return(s) the amount rightfully
belonging to another"); Reid v. Gruntal & Co., 763 F. Supp. 672 (D. Me. 1991) (permitting
recovery of consequential damages under ERISA § 502 (a) (3)); Weems v. Jefferson-Pilot Life
Ins. Co., 663 So. 2d 905, (Ala. 1995) (permitting extracontractual and punitive damages
under ERISA), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 971 (1995); see also Russell v. Northrop Grumman Co.,
921 F. Supp. 143, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). The Russellcourt indicates:
While restitution is generally awarded to prevent unjust enrichment to the defen-
dant, this is not required in every case. Additionally, it is not necessary that restitution
be made in kind, "for a court may restore the plaintiff to the position he formerly oc-
cupied 'either by the return of something which he formerly had or by the receipt of
its equivalent in money.'"
Id. (citations omitted).
325. See, e.g., Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 150 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 1998)
(refusing to impose a constructive trust to hold ill-gotten gains from a breach of fiduciary
duty).
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VI. LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS
While we are comfortable with our conclusion that the three in-
dustries we have studied are compatible with our model, we
reiterate that our purpose in this article is only to sketch a theory.
More research is necessary, and we acknowledge the potential limi-
tations of the analysis. We recognize, for example, that our analysis
of the first two industries relies on the work of other scholars and
does not come from analysis of the underlying cases themselves.
Our focus, therefore, was whether the evidence could plausibly
support our model, not whether our model was a better descrip-
tion of the evidence than those presented by other scholars. Also,
many have pointed out that an analysis of only appellate opinions,
particularly with regard to the railroads and mass production, is
flawed by the fact that the needs and history of each state were dif-
ferent.326 At a time when the railroads were in favor in the West, for
instance, they were subject to backlash in the East.3 2 7 It is not clear
that we, or the scholars before us, have paid adequate attention to
this issue, which may undermine any global conclusions.
As to the managed care industry, our work is not yet complete.
We have analyzed large numbers of cases but have not yet done a
statistical analysis of the results. Thus, we are susceptible to the
criticism that our results are as yet only impressionistic.
There are two possible ways in which the managed care industry
may diverge from the patterns seen in the earlier examples. First,
we live now in the "Age of Statutes,"0 28 with significant, byzantine,
and growing regulation of health care delivery. 29 Though statutes
influenced the direction of doctrine in the other two industries,
particularly with regard to the railroads, regulation was not as per-
vasive. Doctrinal change-at least to the extent it is the product of
judicial initiative-may be altered in the managed care context by
legislative intervention, perhaps marking a different trajectory of
development.
Jurisprudential theory and style has probably also changed from
the heyday of railroads and mass production. For example, courts
may now be more subject to one particular interpretive constraint
that may curb judicial creativity and activism: their perception of
the judicial role.3 Indeed, the refrain in ERISA cases in which
326. See Rabin, supra note 36, at 955.
327. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 512.
328. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1985).
329. See generallyJacobson & Goldman, supra note 187.
330. SeeJacobson & Pomfret, Physician Autonomy, supra note 241, at 13-15, 20-21.
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MCOs achieve immunity from liability, despite evidence of their
wrongful conduct, is that the injustice must be curbed by Congress,
not the courts. 33' The legitimacy of a judge's "imposition" of his
332own "policy" choices is under sustained attack. In particular, we
speculate that this perception of the judicial role may result in a
preference for more rigid rather than more flexible doctrine in
which discretion is allocated to the elected legislature rather than
the judiciary.
CONCLUSION
The advantage of studying historical analogies is that they offer a
different perspective on current judicial doctrine that is otherwise
controversial and unsettled. By looking at how courts developed
legal doctrine for previous shifts in the railroads and industrial
goods and services, we have a better understanding of where we
are in the development of legal doctrine for managed care. This
perspective might also aid judges in achieving a more sustainable
legal regime for the challenging policy conflicts created by man-
aged care.
Lessons Learned
If our analysis of the development of legal doctrine at points of
significant industrial change is correct, several lessons follow. First,
our analysis suggests one way in which courts adjust legal doctrine
to meet changing social and organizational arrangements. Given
the interactive nature of developing legal doctrine between the
courts, stakeholders, and legislators, this suggests that legislators
and other stakeholders can play an important role in shaping the
direction and outcome of the courts' deliberations.
Second, the model we propose can be used to predict the vari-
ous stages courts will go through before arriving at a stable set of
rules. While our model does not predict the doctrinal outcome of
331. See Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196, 200 (lst Cir.
1997); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 304 (8th Cir. 1993); Corcoran
v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1338-39 (5th Cir. 1992);.
332. Cf Lessig, supra note 9, at 1793-95 (noting shifts in courts' perceptions of their
own role in interpreting the common law, from an approach reflective of private under-
standings to one that was normative and rationalizing).
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the process, it will help scholars place the development in a
broader context that could assistjudges in achieving stable rules. It
does, however, predict that eventually courts will select a set of
principles and stable rules to impose more legal accountability on
the mature industry than on the industry in its nascent phase.
Third, this analysis suggests that because courts are reluctant to
interfere with emerging market arrangements, they end up pro-
tecting new industries. The common law is generally reflective of a
pattern of favoring markets and thereby facilitating innovation. To
suggest that courts tend to favor the innovation of new industries is
not to imply a Marxist analysis where courts simply favor the ruling
class. For one thing, it takes courts time to understand the policy
and market implications of the new industry. For another, at least
to some extent, courts may be taking a wait-and-see approach to
assess the implications of the market transformation. As we have
seen in each of our examples, courts have trouble initially in un-
derstanding the new innovations. Further complicating the courts'
doctrinal response is that they inevitably must respond to the early
cases by using legal doctrine developed for a previous set of cir-
cumstances. Over time, as judges become more comfortable with
the language and arrangements of the new industry, courts begin
to set limits on the new industry and impose rules that constrain
how freely the industry actors can behave without accountability.
Fourth, this inevitably raises the question of which legal regime,
and which liability standard and subsidiary rules, is most appropri-
ate for holding the industry accountable-tort or contract, or a
mix of both. To be sure, our analysis suggests that it is not an ei-
ther/or question. For the most part, tort and contract operate in
tandem, allowing courts to choose from a variety of legal options
depending on the goals sought to be achieved. But since one ap-
proach is likely to be used to establish baseline principles for
judicial thinking, it is important to understand how and why tort or
contract rules become the operative legal regime. Just as impor-
tant, even within tort or contract, choices need to be made both as
to the liability standard and its subsidiary rules. For example,
courts could have imposed strict liability in the railroad example
and negligence for mass products, resulting in very different ac-
countability outcomes.
In both of the selected historical examples, tort law emerged as
the dominant-but by no means exclusive-method for achieving
accountability. For railroads, the courts adopted a negligence li-
ability standard; for mass production, the courts chose strict
liability. This suggests that courts will eventually select some form
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of tort to hold MCOs accountable. So far, however, courts in man-
aged care cases have generally deferred to market arrangements,
usually based in contract, and to the legislatures.3 Although courts
have applied hospital liability principles to MCOs, they have not yet
adopted tort doctrine in considering challenges to cost contain-
ment initiatives.
How and why one regime emerges instead of the other remains
an important and inconclusive area of legal scholarship. It is also
important for stakeholders. In managed care, for instance, the as-
signment of liability rules will affect the power balance between
physicians and MCOs, as well as the ability of.plan subscribers to
challenge cost containment initiatives. If courts shift to a contract-
based legal regime, this will most likely restrict the subscriber's
ability to challenge cost containment initiatives, while a tort-based
regime will most likely be more patient-friendly.
Research Implications
We view this Article as a first step in developing a workable
model for understanding the development of legal doctrine in
nascent or radically changing industries. From a research perspec-
tive, it will be important to monitor how courts rule in the more
contentious managed care legal issues likely to arise over the next
few years. For instance, we expect courts to face more directly the
conflict between individual health care needs and the resources
available to the patient population as MCOs continue to seek ways
to control health care costs. Our continuing work in producing a
statistical analysis of trends in managed care cases will supplement
the qualitative analysis offered in this article.3 '
Scholars should also compare the development of legal doctrine
in managed care to how courts resolve issues related to new infor-
mation technologies, especially the expansion of the internet. If a
similar pattern holds as we have described here, then our model
will have additional salience.
This confirmation (or perhaps refutation) of our approach
would be important because judges are aware of the need for new
approaches to these types of problems. Several years ago, for ex-
ample, Judge Jack Weinstein, who has presided over many
333. SeeJacobson, Legal Challenges, supra note 3, at 79.
334. We agree with Judge Richard Posner that quantitative analysis is an important
complement to traditional legal scholarship.
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important mass tort cases, proposed thatjudges apply a framework
based on communitarian theory in deciding the social policy issues
now confronting the courts.335 Although Judge Weinstein did not
specify how the communitarian theory could be operationalized by
judges, he argued that judges currently lack an adequate concep-
tual framework for balancing complex policy tradeoffs between
individual litigants and the collective interests of other affected
groups.336 Regardless of the merits of the communitarian frame-
work, the Weinstein article suggests that judges are searching to
devise and apply innovative models to problems that courts have
had difficulty resolving.
Finally, our brief survey may help illuminate, but will certainly
not resolve, the controversies surrounding the rise of railroads and
mass products and the judicial response. Nor is our approach nec-
essarily the correct set of lessons to be derived from a historical
analysis. We invite further scholarly inquiry and commentary on
our interpretation and alternative lessons that would help under-
stand the development of legal doctrine in these areas.
335. See Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv.
470, 485-93 (1994).
336. See id. at 472, 540.
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